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Articles
PROPORTIONALITY:
A MUCH-NEEDED SOLUTION TO THE




A fundamental precept of American jurisprudence is the apportionment of
liability based on fault, with culpable parties paying their fair share of damages.
As logical and fair as that proposition appears, it is increasingly the exception
rather than the rule in some areas of litigation, particularly federal securities
fraud litigation against certified public accountants. Achieving equitable
outcomes by relating the degree of liability to the proportion of damages or
settlements paid is nearly impossible in most such cases. By mandating joint
and several liability, federal securities laws and some state laws encourage suits
against "deep pocket" defendants, such as accounting firms, for the sole purpose
of extracting settlements from those parties, regardless of their actual
responsibility, if any, for the losses suffered. In this respect, the current system
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reinforces and rewards the filing of lawsuits based on the ability to pay rather
than on the level of culpability.
Existing data show large numbers of such suits and nearly limitless financial
exposure for accounting firms. Indeed, unwarranted securities fraud litigation
is now so significant that it threatens the continued viability of the audit
function. Major accounting firms face massive litigation exposure. The cost of
defending meritless cases, of which there are many, is inordinately high. Far
from being commonplace commercial disputes between two parties, shareholder
class actions are among the largest cases in the federal judicial system. These
"facts of life" have inexorably led major accounting firms to develop stringent
risk management programs that focus on vulnerability to litigation, not on the
ability to audit successfully. Consequently, promising but high-risk companies-
whose products and services our nation must bring to market to remain globally
competitive-are, and will increasingly be, deprived of valuable professional
expertise.
Accounting firms are not the only victims of the present shareholder class
action system and the runaway joint and several liability that lies at its core.
The current system fails fairly to compensate investors, large and small, who are
the victims of real fraud and who recover only a few cents on the dollar. It also
discourages managements from disclosing the very type of information that is
essential for intelligent investor decisions. Indeed, these lawsuits create
incentives to withhold information-precisely the opposite effect of what the
securities laws were meant to accomplish in public policy. Finally, joint and
several liability disproportionately affects high-tech and growth companies,
thereby diverting resources that would otherwise fuel innovation and job
creation.
We believe that a rule of proportionate liability would go a long way
toward rectifying these serious and growing problems. Proportionality can
break the magnetic attraction of class action lawyers to deep pocket defendants,
regardless of the merits of the underlying case. Reforming joint and several
liability would help relieve much of the nonmerit-based pressure to settle these
abusive cases. Because the amount of recovery from each defendant would be
limited by the degree of the defendant's culpability, the merits of the claim
would matter more to plaintiffs' lawyers than the depths of the defendant's
pocket. Furthermore, proportionate liability would encourage lawyers to seek
greater compensation for those who are truly defrauded, by changing incentives
for attorneys from filing and settling as many cases as possible, without regard
to merit, to obtaining more money for investors whose cases have real merit.
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This Article begins by tracing the history of the concept of "fair share"
liability.' We focus first on the development of comparative fault, which has
replaced contributory negligence as the law of the land in forty-six of the fifty
states, and then we summarize the historical background of joint and several
liability, the results of a more liberal interpretation of that doctrine, and the
response of state legislatures and courts to that interpretation through adoption
of various forms of proportionate liability. Against this historical backdrop, this
Article then addresses the problem of joint and several liability in accountants'
malpractice claims, particularly in shareholder class actions under the federal
securities laws. The reasons why it is unreasonable and unfair to make auditors
the "deep pocket" defendant are discussed,2 as are the consequences of this
trend for the audit function.3 The negative consequences of these lawsuits on
investors, high-tech and growth companies, and the overall securities system are
also discussed.4 We conclude by proposing the adoption of proportionate
liability as the new standard to replace joint and several liability in all cases that
do not involve intentional fraud.'
II. EROSION OF THE CONCEPT OF "FAIR SHARE LIABILITY"
Embedded in the foundation of this nation's jurisprudence is the concept of
apportioning liability based on fault. Indeed, far from being a new or radical
idea, it is an outgrowth of the notion of "comparative fault," which has replaced
"contributory negligence" as the law of the land in forty-six of the fifty states.
The historical development of contributory negligence, and its subsequent virtual
abandonment in favor of a system based on degree of fault, reflect changes in
judicial and societal views of the role of the tort system in effectively
compensating victims and deterring wrongdoers. Unfortunately, however, this
concept of "fair share liability" was then eroded by widespread application of
"joint and several liability" against defendants. While a majority of states have
since limited this concept in different ways and to different degrees, joint and
several liability remains a serious problem at both the state and federal level.
A. Contributory Negligence
The doctrine of "contributory negligence" was first adopted in the United
States in the early nineteenth century, when a Massachusetts court held that an
action could not be maintained unless the plaintiff could show that he had used
1. See infra text accompanying notes 6-53.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 54-81.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 82-116.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 117-57.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 158-67.
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"ordinary care" to protect himself.6 Under this doctrine, even though both
parties are at fault, liability falls wholly on the plaintiff, regardless of whether
his negligence made a substantial or material contribution to his injury.7 The
primary rationale for this harsh doctrine was that the plaintiff's negligence
supersedes the defendant's actions as the proximate cause of the injury
suffered.8 It was considered beneficial to society to penalize the plaintiff for
his misconduct and to deter him from injuring himself.9 Moreover, as a
general policy, common law courts routinely held that a wrongdoer should not
be entitled to seek relief from the courts.'°
Since juries could not find for an injured plaintiff unless they determined
him to be blameless, they often stretched, or at least appeared to stretch,. the law
to fit their own view of an equitable result. Faced with an all-or-nothing choice
with respect to recovery for the plaintiff, juries sought to take it upon themselves
to do justice where a defendant did share some responsibility for the loss.
As dissatisfaction with the all-or-nothing system grew, it eventually led to
the adoption of several exemptions. For example, contributory negligence did
not serve as a bar to the plaintiff's recovery where the defendant's conduct was
intentional; where the defendant had the "last clear chance" to exercise ordinary
care and avoid the plaintiff's injury; or where the plaintiff's negligence was
remote. Despite these exemptions, the burden of loss was still placed upon one
person where two were, in effect, responsible. As a result, contributory
negligence continued to preclude the equitable allocation of damages between
plaintiff and defendant.
B. Comparative Negligence
In 1908, Congress adopted the first federal comparative negligence statute,
which was designed to rectify the often unjust outcome of suits brought by
6. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. 621, 624 (1824). The common law doctrine of contributory
negligence is traced to Lord Ellenborough's opinion in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103
Eng. Rep. 926 (1909). The court held that the plaintiff could recover for his injuries if the
defendant breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiff, and if the plaintiff, in spite of the defendant's
conduct, exhibited "no want of ordinary care" in avoiding harm to himself. In other words, the
plaintiff must not have contributed to his own injury. Id.
7. W. PAGE KEETON ul AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451-52 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
8. Id. at 452.
9. Prepositions used in the masculine are intended to include the feminine, and vice versa.
10. John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple Torrfeasors Be Abolished?,
10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 193, 196 (1986).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [1994], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss3/3
1994] PROPORTIONALITY 871
injured railway employees."1  Under this "pure" comparative negligence
statute, a plaintiff could recover damages from the negligent railroad regardless
of the extent of his own negligence; those damages were merely reduced by the
percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff's own actions. Following this
federal lead, numerous states adopted statutes providing specific relief to railroad
employees. '
By the early 1970s and 1980s, a flood of legislative and judicial activity
brought relatively comprehensive adoption of comparative fault by the states. 3
The threshold issue for most jurisdictions was whether to adopt a "pure" or
"modified" comparative negligence system. Those opting for the modified
version had to determine what degree of fault should preclude a plaintiff's
recovery. Most jurisdictions chose between allowing the plaintiff to be as
negligent, but no more negligent, than the defendant (the 50% Rule), or
allowing the plaintiff to recover only if he is actually less negligent than the
11. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. Prior to the adoption of the federal statute, the concept of
comparative negligence was recognized in the U.K. and the U.S., even as the doctrine of
contributory negligence was developing. The equity courts had long recognized comparative
negligence as an integral part of admiralty law. HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1:4, at
18 (1987). In fact, Dean Prosser noted that, by 1953, the U.S. was virtually the last country with
a modern judicial system, whether common or civil law based, to apply contributory negligence as
a general standard. Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and most of Europe were apportioning
damages. This is due, in part, to the fact that comparative negligence was much more readily
accepted in other legal systems where trial by judge was more common than trial by jury. See
Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountants' Liability to Third Parties for Negligent
Misrepresentation: The Search for a New Limiting Principle, 30 AM. Bus. L. J. 345, 376 (Nov.
1992). A judicial fact finder was thought to be more capable of apportioning damage than a lay
jury.
12. In 1910, Mississippi became the first state to adopt a pure comparative negligence statute
for all personal injury actions and, by 1920, the statute was expanded to include damages to
property. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972). In 1913, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted a
comparative negligence system that permitted a plaintiff to recover so long as his degree of
negligence was less than that of the defendant. Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 79 S.E. 836 (Ga. 1913).
While this was the precursor to "modified comparative fault" statutes, the idea attracted little interest
beyond the legal community until the early 1930s, when Wisconsin adopted a general comparative
negligence statute mandating that a plaintiff could recover only if his negligence was 'not as great
as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought." WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045
(1989-90). See WOODS, supra note 11, at 25.
13. Leibman & Kelly, supra note 11, at 376-77 n.155. Only four states and the District of
Columbia have not adopted comparative negligence. Twelve states-Alaska, California, Florida,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and
Washington-have adopted pure comparative negligence as their standard. ALASKA STAT. §
09.17.060 (Supp. 1993); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431, 1431.2 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.81 (West Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (1991); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2323 (West Sapp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-
15 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.067 (1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Michie 1989); N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1411 (McKinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.22.070 (1988).
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defendant (the 49 % Rule). In all, ten states have adopted the Modified 49 %
Rule, 14 and twenty-three states have adopted the Modified 50% Rule.' 5
In sum, an overwhelming majority of the states have jettisoned the all-or-
nothing contributory negligence approach, choosing instead to apportion liability
more fairly between plaintiff and defendant pursuant to the doctrine of
comparative negligence. This, of course, raises the issue of why the same
principles of equity should not apply to apportioning liability among multiple
defendants or joint tortfeasors. We turn next to that question.
C. Origins of "Joint and Several" Liability
The doctrine ofjoint and several liability initially developed as two separate
theories of liability. At common law, joint liability was strictly limited,
applying only to joint tortfeasors acting in concert or in conspiracy.'" Under
this narrow interpretation of the doctrine, if the parties did not act in concert,
joinder, and hence joint liability, were not permitted. Since concert of action
and a common plan usually characterize actions involving a higher degree of
intent or scienter, true joint liability was originally an issue only in cases
involving intentional torts. '
7
14. Modified 49% Rule states: Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (Supp. 1993); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-111.5(1) (1989); IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Supp.
1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-103 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1992); W. VA. CODE § 55-
7B-9 (Supp. 1993). South Dakota has chosen a system that ignores the 49/50 distinction and applies
joint and several liability where the plaintiff's negligence is "slight." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 20-9-2 (1987).
15. Modified 50% Rule states: Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572@h) (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1992);
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33 (Supp. 1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 735, para. 5/2-1116 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-3 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 668.3 (1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1986); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 604.01 (West 1998 & Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1993); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-21, 185.10 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507:7-d (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15.5.1-.5.3 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993);
OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13, 14 (West
1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (1982 & Supp. 1993);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-30 (Supp. 1993); TEx. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001 - .017
(1986 & Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1993); WIS STAT. ANN. § 895.045
(1983); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988).
16. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 323. At common law, a joint tort required a concert
of action, a common plan, or, later on, a breach of a joint duty.
17. Smithson v. Garth, 3 Lev. 324, 83 Eng. Rep. 711 (1691).
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If a plaintiff was injured as a result of the acts of two or more tortfeasors
not acting in concert, he could sue any or all of them individually and recover
his full damages, but he could not join all parties in one suit."8 Furthermore,
if he recovered his damages from one defendant, he could not seek recovery
from any of the others. As a result, deep pocket defendants became quite
popular at this early stage of the doctrine's development. When filing his first
claim, a shrewd plaintiff would want to seek out the defendant best able to pay.
If he could recover all of his damages at that stage, he would not need to
proceed further. From a procedural standpoint, the efficiency and economies
associated with holding a single trial were lost. Moreover, recovery could be
obtained from any individual defendant without regard to that defendant's actual
degree of fault.
As application of the doctrine widened, courts adopted a rule that permitted
a plaintiff to join two defendants together in one action where two separate
negligent acts produced a single indivisible harm. 9 Since the jury was still not
considered capable of apportioning damages among the defendants, thejudgment
against each would be for the full amount of damages. The plaintiff was
permitted to recover from the defendants in any way that he found expeditious,
and the defendants still had no legal right of contribution among themselves.
Thus, as the practice of joining defendants who acted separately but created one
indivisible injury grew common, the concept of joint and several liability
became an integral part of the tort system. 20
These changes in apportionment still reflected the continuing application of
contributory negligence. If the plaintiff could recover at all (i.e., was not at
fault or had a suitable defense), the question then became how much damage the
defendants collectively should pay, not the individual defendant's degree of fault.
Eventually, the adoption of comparative negligence by the majority of states led
to the adoption of "comparative contribution,"2' pursuant to which the fact
18. Wade, supra note 10, at 194.
19. Id.
20. Courts also developed a parallel theory of "alternative liability" to address situations where
one of two or more defendants individually caused the injury to the plaintiff, but where the defendant
causing the injury cannot be satisfactorily identified. This is the textbook case of Summers v. Tice,
199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), where two hunters aimed carelessly and shot in the direction of the plaintiff.
At trial, the plaintiff could not say with certainty which of the defendants had caused his injury. The
court held both defendants liable and did not require the plaintiff to identify the defendant actually
at fault. Under these circumstances, each defendant must prove that he did not proximately cause
the plaintiff's injury or be liable jointly and severally with his codefendant(s). This theory of
alternative liability was adopted primarily because public policy dictated that the plaintiff should not
be without a remedy where the harm was clear, but the cause was ambiguous. This shifting of the
burden of proof was eventually adopted by the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433(B)(3) (1965).
21. Wade, supra note 10, at 197.
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finder must determine the percentage of fault of each of the parties to the action
and establish an amount for which each is primarily responsible. Each
defendant remained liable for the full amount of damage to the plaintiff,
however, and could still be held liable for that full amount regardless of the
percentage of fault assigned.'
D. Results of More Liberal Interpretation of Joint and Several Liability
As a matter of policy, several justifications-occasionally conflicting-have
supported joint and several liability. These include the need to encourage
socially desirable behaviors (such as caution and responsibility); 3 the need to
compensate innocent plaintiffs; the desire to distribute losses among the parties;
and, eventually, the desire to force the lion's share of damages onto those with
the greatest ability to pay.'
The need to punish those with any degree of fault was sufficient
justification for imposing joint and several liability at common law. As the
doctrine was expanded to apply to non-intentional torts, however, culpability
alone was not sufficient. A popular alternative rationale then developed that
highlighted the need to compensate innocent plaintiffs. This rationale was
appealing so long as the plaintiff was truly blameless; after the adoption of
comparative negligence, it lost some force, because now the plaintiff was often
not wholly innocent. Eventually, many believed that it would be beneficial to
distribute losses throughout society via insurance companies or other types of
social insurance programs. This rationale was particularly appealing in product
liability cases, where multiple insured parties had introduced a product and all
had benefitted financially from sales of the defective item.2
Recently, the trend has been to shift loss onto those best able to pay-"deep
pocket" defendants. As a result, plaintiffs now often sue the party or parties
with the deepest pockets, instead of those who are most responsible for a loss.
22. A majority of individual states have modified in different ways and to different degrees the
application of joint and several liability. See infra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
23. Michael Schofield, Daviesv. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARV. L. REV.
263, 269 (1890).
24. James J. Scheske, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Theory: A Survey of State
Approaches, 54 J. AIR LAW & COM. 627, 631 (1988).
25. This notion is even supported in the language of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act drafied
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT
ACT § 3 (1977, as amended 1979), 12 U.L.A. 53 (Supp. 1993). "I]n attaining a fair application
to a particular factual situation, consideration needs to be given to the circumstances of whether each
party is able to pay his obligation and whether the payment comes from his own pocket or from
liability insurance covering him." Id. at 45. This concept had a tremendous impact on the
disposition of automobile accident cases, and subsequently on the cost and availability of insurance.
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Indeed, although juries commonly find that a deep pocket defendant's liability
is slight, the doctrine of joint and several liability subjects those defendants to
liability for the full amount of damages. One court, for example, held Walt
Disney World liable for eighty-six percent of a $75,000judgment, even though,
at trial, they were found to be only one percent at fault.' This lends support
to the notion that deep pocket defendants are often sued primarily because other,
far more culpable defendants are judgment-proof or have inadequate funds.
These developments were not without high social costs. For example,
municipalities are now often sued as deep pockets in cases where their passive
roles are said to have caused an accident. The city of Los Angeles, for
instance, was left to pay almost $2 million in damages to a plaintiff hit in a city
intersection, even though the defendant driver was intoxicated at the time he ran
the stop sign and struck the plaintiff. Because the driver had no money and the
other co-defendants settled for the amount of their insurance policies, the city
had to pay the bulk of the damages.' Under these circumstances, it is no
wonder that local governments today cite joint and several liability as a reason
for higher taxes and reductions in public services such as playgrounds and pools.
But beyond the municipal sphere, there are much broader implications for
society. For example, corporations are no longer willing to take risks even with
vital products, because the burden of potential liability is too great.'
26. Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987). The plaintiff was found to
be 14% at fault in a bumper car accident, while her fianc6 was found 85 % at fault and Disney 1%.
The fiancd was a non-contributing defendant and, as such, the trial court assigned Disney the full
86% of damages.
27. The plaintiff argued that the city should have put up signs to warn of the upcoming stop
sign and should have trimmed hedges located on private property that partially blocked the stop sign.
Sills v. City of Los Angeles, C-333504 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1985). In another case,
a drunk driver collided with another vehicle coming in the opposite direction as he crossed the center
line ona curve. The city of San Diego was joined based on a claim that the accident was the result
of a faulty road design. The driver settled for $25,000 (the amount of his insurance policy) and the
city settled for $1.6 million after the initial court proceedings. Duggan v. City of San Diego, No.
484152 (San Diego Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1984). In yet another case, a motorcycle collided with a car
that turned in front of it. The motorcycle passenger was wearing a large belt buckle which injured
the driver of the motorcycle when the passenger slid forward on impact and hit him in the back.
The motorcycle driver sued, among others, Rayco, Inc., who had reupholstered the cycle's seat.
The driver claimed that the fabric was stretched too tight, making it "excessively slippery." The
driver of the automobile settled for $25,000 (the amount of her insurance policy); the other
defendants had little or no assets, and Rayco was held liable for the $2.5 million in damages.
Laurenti v. Tiffenbauch, No. A-6247-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 2, 1984).
28. For example, the University of Wisconsin admits that it hesitates to sell licenses for
university patents to small businesses because of concerns that a suit against such companies may
result in the university being sought out as a deep pocket by plaintiffs, based on its initial research
of the idea. Union Carbide developed a portable kidney dialysis unit for home use. It subsequently
sold the business to a foreign company after determining that the potential risks of litigation made
the product uneconomical. Genentech, a leading U.S. biotechnology company, halted its AIDS
vaccine research after the California legislature failed to enact state tort reform, and Bristol-Myers
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E. Modification of Joint and Several Liability at the State Level
By and large, modifications to the applicability of joint and several liability
at the state level either have been contemporaneous with the states' change to
comparative fault or have reflected subsequent recognition of the inequitable
outcomes when comparative fault and joint and several liability are applied
concurrently. Tennessee, one of the most recent states to convert to
comparative fault, noted in doing so that having "adopted a rule more closely
linking liability and fault, it would be inconsistent to simultaneously retain a
rule, joint and several liability, which may fortuitously impose a degree of
liability that is out of all proportion to fault."' As Dean Prosser has said,
"No one ever succeeded in justifying that as a policy [i.e., visiting the entire
loss on one of two parties that caused it], and no one ever will." °
Significantly, thirty-seven states have altered their statutes, responding in
some degree to the inequities of joint and several liability.3 These states have
recognized that joint and several liability fails to serve the public interest because
it encourages suits against defendants with deep pockets, regardless of their
responsibility. They have sought to curb abuse of the litigation system by
requiring that secondary wrongdoers pay only for the damage they cause.
Thus, eight states-Alaska, Kansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, and Wyoming-have eliminated joint and several liability entirely,
concluding that defendants should at all times be liable in tort actions for their
proportionate share of the harm. Roughly half of these states adopted reform
in conjunction with an abandonment of contributory negligence. This suggests
that states find it easier to justify proportionate liability, which insists that the
plaintiff take his defendants as he finds them, when the plaintiff's prior
Squibb abandoned one promising research approach because of liability concerns. Studies have been
cited that indicate "47% of U.S. manufacturers have withdrawn products from the market, [and]
39% have decided not to introduce new product lines. .. as a direct result of their product liability
experience.. .." See HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITIVENESS, COMM. ON
SCIENCE, SPACE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT ON PRODucT LIABILITY, H.R. REP. No. 167, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Dec. 1992) (emphasis added).
29. McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992) (emphasis added). Also note that
even though Massachusetts courts have, to date, declined to change the state's common law view
that defendants are jointly and severally liable, they have noted recently that "the comparative
negligence system has its merits in a case where one tortfeasor incurs minimal negligence and the
other tortfeasors are insolvent, enjoy limited liability or are otherwise protected by operation of law,
or in instances where the plaintiff incurs substantial contributory negligence." Joia v. Jo-Ja Service
Corp., 817 F.2d 908, 917 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
30. Leibman & Kelly, supra note 11, at 376 n.154 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
7).
31. Stated differently, only 13 states and the District of Columbia still retain the concept of joint
and several liability at all times and for all cases.
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alternative was no recovery at all unless he was blameless.
Six more states have adopted proportionate liability while specifically
excluding cases involving intentional torts and/or strict liability.32 New
Mexico, for example, maintains joint and several liability for intentional torts,
for cases based on strict liability, and in other situations with a "sound basis in
public policy."" This implicitly recognizes that joint and several liability is
essentially punitive, because it forces a defendant to pay more than his fair share
of damages. For cases that involve a higher degree of culpability (a "knowing"
action), payment of all damages, even if punitive, is seen as acceptable.
The most common exceptions to proportionate liability in those states which
have partially retained the joint and several rule are for "large-scale" torts.
Consequently, in certain mass injury situations, compensation to the victim is
deemed to hold the highest priority. For instance, some jurisdictions retain joint
and several liability for cases relating to toxic torts and hazardous waste
disposal.' Others maintain joint and several liability for automobile and airline
accidents35 or for product liability cases. 3' Idaho retains joint and several
liability for cases involving pharmaceutical manufacturers or medical device
manufacturers, since defective drugs or faulty medical devices may cause large-
scale injury.
32. Florida, Hawaii, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and North Dakota. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.81 (3) (West Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41.141 (Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Michie 1989); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. &
R. 1601, 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1993). Under New
York law, joint and several liability applies to certain product liability suits, knowing or intentional
acts, acts in concert, and hazardous waste cases. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1602 (McKinney Supp.
1994).
33. Recently, this was held to include cases in which precautions were not taken against
inherent dangers. Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 827 P.2d 102 (N.M. 1992).
34. Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1992);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 6-803 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. §
41.141(5)(c) (Supp. 1993); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1994); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.485 (1988); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.012 (1986 & Supp. 1994);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070(3)(a) (1988).
35. Hawaii and New York. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (Supp. 1992); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.
& R. 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1994).
36. Hawaii, Nevada (strict liability cases and defective product cases), New Mexico (strict
liability), New York, North Dakota, and Washington (generic product cases). HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 663-10.9 (E) (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (5) (Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
41-3A-1(C)(3) (Michie 1989); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1602 (10) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.E.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070(3)(c) (1988).
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While not necessarily set forth in specific terms in the statute, the policy
rationale for preserving joint and several liability in these large-scale injury
cases appears to be the need to compensate victims who have suffered personal
injuries as a result of some mass disaster, and to punish the perpetrator of such
a disaster who, through a single act or product, caused widespread harm.
Compensation and deterrence are needed most when injury or death results from
water that has been poisoned, from hazardous waste that has been dumped, or
from a defective aircraft that has crashed.
Several states have adopted proportionate liability where the defendant's
culpability falls below some fixed percentage."7 This reflects a policy choice
not to impose the full burden of liability upon a tangentially liable defendant."
Four states consider the plaintiff's degree of fault, if any, by applying
proportionate liability if the plaintiff bears some degree of fault. 9  The
remaining fourteen states look to the defendant's degree of liability, sometimes
providing a specific percentage below which a defendant will be held liable only
for its proportionate share,' and sometimes requiring that the defendant's fault
37. Some states look to the fault of the plaintiff, see infra note 39, and others to the fault of the
defendant(s), see infra note 40, either in relation to each other and/or in relation to the plaintiff, see
infra note 41.
38. Florida provides for proportionate liability for damages in excess of $25,000 (FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1993)), and Mississippi holds defendants jointly liable only to the point
where the plaintiff has recovered 50% of his damages (MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972)). In
addition to fashioning exceptions based on the characteristics of the case or the litigants, a few states
have chosen to provide for reallocation of damages. This permits an insolvent or sometimes absent
or immune defendant's share of damages to be reallocated among the remaining parties. States
permitting reallocation of uncollectible damages: Connecticut (non-economic damages only),
Michigan, Missouri, Montana (specifically notes that the reallocation includes defendants who are
otherwise severally liable), and New Hampshire. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (h) (West
1991); MICH. COMIP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304 (1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.067 (1988); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-703 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (Supp. 1992). Sometimes the
reallocation includes the plaintiff and sometimes merely the other defendants. This is slightly less
onerous than joint and several liability where there are multiple defendants; if the plaintiff is not
included in the reallocation, and there is only one remaining solvent defendant, however, the result
is precisely the same as if joint and several liability had been used in the first place.
39. Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, and Texas. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33 (Supp. 1993);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304 (1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.067 (1988); TEX. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013 (1986 & Supp. 1994).
40. States adopting this approach to proportionate liability include: Illinois (defendant is 25%
or less liable, or has been assigned less fault than that attributed to the plaintiff and the other
defendants individually), Indiana (defendant less than 50% at fault), Iowa (defendants less than 50%
at fault), Minnesota (defendant less than 15 % liable is limited to damages of four times his degree
of fault), Montana (defendants less than 50% liable), New Hampshire (defendants less than 50%
liable), New Jersey (defendant is less than 20% liable, several for non-economic damages if
defendant is 20-60% liable, otherwise joint and several), New York (economic damages and
defendant is less than 50% at fault), Oregon (for economic damages where defendant is less than
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be less than the plaintiffs in order to qualify for proportionate liability'
Some states mandate proportionate liability based on the type of damages
awarded to the plaintiff. For example, nine states limit the applicability of joint
and several liability by drawing a distinction between economic and non-
economic damages.42 Of these, only California, Nebraska, and Ohio cite this
as a sole distinction, granting proportionate liability to defendants only for non-
economic damages. 43  The remaining states hold defendants jointly and
severally liable for economic damages, or specifically permit defendants to be
held proportionately liable for non-economic damages." Hawaii and New
York conditionally hold defendants jointly and severally liable for non-economic
damages.45
All of the reforms to joint and several liability previously discussed were
based on legislative action. But several state courts have modified joint and
several liability as well. In some of these states, the legislatures acted after the
judicial decision by amending the relevant statute, while in others the judicial
decision alone continues to apply.
15% at fault), South Dakota (defendants less than 50% at fault are limited to two times their
percentage of liability), and Texas (defendant's fault is less than 20%). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735,
para 5/2-117 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-5(b) (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668.4 (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-703 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-3 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15.5.3
(West 1987 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1601, 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1994); OR.
REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 15-8-15.1 (Supp. 1993); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013 (1986 & Supp. 1994).
41. Louisiana (proportionate if plaintiff's degree of fault is greater than defendant's), Missouri
(if plaintiff's fault is greater than defendant's, defendant's damages are limited to twice his
percentage of fault), Oregon (proportionate if defendant's fault is less than plaintiff's), and Texas
(Joint and several where defendant is more than 20% liable and his fault exceeds that of the
plaintiff). LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West Supp. 1993); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.067 (1988);
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1988); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33-013 (1986 & Supp.
1994).
42. See infra notes 43-45. "Non-economic damages" are subjectively determined losses
including, but not limited to, damages for pain and suffering and emotional distress.
43. Ohio allows proportionate liability for non-economic damages only if the plaintiff is found
at fault. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1991).
44. Connecticut, Florida (at the court's discretion if the defendant's fault is equal to or greater
than the plaintiff's fault), Hawaii, Montana, New York, and Oregon (defendants severally liable for
economic damages, too, if defendant less than 15% at fault). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572(h)
(West 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(3) (West Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9
(Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703 (1993); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1601, 1602
(McKinney Supp. 1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.485 (1988).
45. Hawaii (if the defendant is more than 25 % at fault) and New York (if the defendant is more
than 50% liable). HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (Supp. 1992); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 1601,
1602 (McKinney Supp. 1994).
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As previously discussed, for example, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
abandoned the doctrine of joint and several liability at the same time that it
adopted the doctrine of comparative fault. Drawing support from the decisions
of other state courts on the issue, the court indicated that its conclusion was
based on considerations of fairness to both plaintiffs and defendants.' 6
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court, in construing the state's adoption of
comparative fault by statute, noted that the legislature's purpose was clear: it
"intended to equate recovery and duty to pay with degree of fault."
47
Accordingly, the court maintained that this necessitated a change in both the
doctrine of contributory negligence and the doctrine ofjoint and several liability:
"There is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is ten percent at fault
paying 100% of the loss, and there is no social policy that should compel
defendants to pay more than their fair share of the loss. Plaintiffs now take the
parties as they find them."'
In Hilen v. Hays, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted comparative fault,
noting that "in a system in which liability is based upon fault, the extent of the
fault should govern the extent of the liability."49 In a later decision, the court
ruled that, since a plaintiff who is only partially at fault cannot be required to
bear the entire loss, it should follow logically that "a defendant who is only
partially at fault in causing an injury should not be required to bear the entire
loss but should, likewise, be chargeable only to the extent of his fault. "'
Using the same logic, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that "if a jury
is capable of apportioning fault between a plaintiff and defendant, it should be
no more difficult for it to allocate fault among several defendants. "5  The
court concluded that it would be "obviously inconsistent" with the equitable
principles of comparative negligence to hold the defendant tortfeasor who is only
twenty percent at fault responsible for the entire amount of damages.5 2
Unfortunately, for those who operate nationwide, the state-by-state
approach to change discussed in this Section is exceedingly slow and produces
46. See Mcintyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992), discussed supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
47. Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 873-74 (Kan. 1978).
48. Id. at 874. See also Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M.
App. 1982).
49. Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984) (citation omitted).
50. Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 696 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Ky. 1985).
51. Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Okla. 1978).
52. Id.
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a hodgepodge of complex rules. Moreover, plaintiffs' lawyers can easily
"venue-shop," thereby avoiding states that have enacted effective reforms.
Further, as noted by the drafters of the Model Comparative Fault Act, state laws
"var[y] considerably, and the form adopted often comes about as a result of a
political compromise and without adequate consideration of the practical
implications. ,51
As a result, the very positive changes in state law described above still
leave serious problems for parties operating on a national basis and have not, of
course, effected any change in federal law. For instance, because corporations
and businesses now routinely deal with purchasers and clients across the
country, plaintiffs can often justify bringing suit in any number of state
jurisdictions; for obvious reasons, they choose the jurisdiction most
advantageous to their claim. This problem is a particularly serious one for
larger accounting firms, which are responsible for the vast majority of audits of
publicly owned companies in this country.
III. THE PROBLEM OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
IN AccOuNTANTs' MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
As it has evolved over several centuries from its original rationale of
ensuring that plaintiffs receive redress for physical injury, joint and several
liability today is a blunt instrument indeed when applied to generally less
threatening, more complex business situations involving economic losses and
multiple actors. Under the joint and several liability system today, achieving
equitable outcomes-relating the degree of responsibility to the proportion of
damages paid-is nearly impossible in most cases. The system encourages suits
against deep pocket defendants, who become virtual guarantors of the full extent
of damages, regardless of how liability (theirs and others') is apportioned.
Accountants' malpractice claims, particularly in the context of federal
securities fraud cases, illustrate the point well. With today's increasingly
volatile markets reflecting an extremely fast-changing, competitive, global
marketplace, stocks of many companies-particularly those in high-tech and
growth industries-fluctuate widely. Life-cycles of new technologies and
products shrink; breakthroughs appear more quickly; and foreign competition
grows. In such an environment, downturns as well as upturns can be more
frequent and widespread, particularly as equity investment has proliferated, with
an impact on total market values measured in the tens and hundreds of millions
of dollars.
53. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1993) (Prefatory Note).
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There is no doubt that, in this complex marketplace, some malfeasance and
even fraud occurs. In a few cases, an auditor may even have known about the
fraud and participated in it. But existing rules of liability-particularly the
availability of joint and several liability for unintentional conduct that may be
characterized as "recklessness" under the federal securities laws-attract a far
greater number of suits that do not involve any such misconduct. And the very
complexity of the marketplace makes it impossible to predict how litigation
about one event in it will be resolved.
The indeterminate character of "recklessness" makes auditors particularly
vulnerable to frivolous suits, because an audit by nature involves considerable
estimation and judgment exercised against materials prepared by others. Joint
and several liability lures plaintiffs with the prospect of potentially huge deep
pocket recoveries or settlements from accounting firms. Indeed, because joint
and several liability threatens responsibility for 100 % of the damages regardless
of how minimal the auditor's culpability, with twenty-twenty hindsight it
demands near-perfection on the part of the auditor in performing a task
that-because it involves estimation and judgment-by definition, cannot be
"perfectly" accomplished. As a result, the future of the audit function is
threatened, with grave consequences for the smooth functioning of our capital
markets and economy as a whole.
A. The Auditor's Actual Role and Relationship to Management
By definition, an audit is an independent opinion on the fairness with which
the financial statements produced by company management present the
company's financial position and results of operations.' The auditor is not
responsible for preparing those statements, which are merely a snapshot of the
results of management's stewardship at a given moment in time. Moreover, an
auditor is clearly not responsible for the innumerable daily decisions of
management that determine the ultimate success or failure of a company, let
alone the short-term rise or fall of its stock. 5 As a majority of the California
Supreme Court wrote in its 1992 Bily decision:
An auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound. As a matter of
commercial reality, audits are performed in a client-controlled
environment. The client typically prepares its own financial state-
ments; it has direct control over and assumes primary responsibility
for their contents ... [and] necessarily furnishes the information base
for the audit . . . .Thus, regardless of the efforts of the auditor, the
54. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, CODIFICATION OF
STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, AU § 110.01 (1992).
55. Id. at AU § 110.02.
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client retains effective primary control of the financial reporting
process. 56
In order to form an audit opinion on financial statements, the auditor is
guided by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Because these
principles are codified only in part, applicable governing rules must be derived.
Furthermore, auditors sample and test a company's transactions selectively.
This examination is based on Generally Accepted Accounting Standards
(GAAS), which, like GAAP, are written in general terms and require
considerable exercise of professional judgment by the auditor."
Thus, the California Supreme Court concluded in Bily that "an audit report
is not a simple statement of verifiable fact that, like the weight of the load of
beans . . . can be easily checked against uniform standards of indisputable
accuracy. Rather, an audit report is a professional opinion based on numerous
and complex factors. "I Insightfully, the Bily court added that the audit report
is "the final product of a complex process involving discretion and judgment on
the part of the auditor at every stage. Using different initial assumptions and
approaches, different sampling techniques, and the wisdom of 20-20 hindsight,
few CPA audits would be immune from criticism.
59
Auditing, then, is as much an art of judgment and experience as an
axiomatic set of procedures. And audit fees are based not on the size of a stock
offering or its degree of success, but purely on the actual audit performed.
Indeed, auditors are prohibited from charging any kind of contingent fee based
on an audit's outcome or effect in the marketplace.' This concept contrasts
sharply with potential gains to be realized in initial public offerings by the
company and other involved parties (and often tangential defendants) such as
investment bankers, whose fees reflect outcomes as well as inputs.
56. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal. 1992) (citations omitted).
57. Robert Mednick, The Auditor's Role in Society: A New Approach to Solving the Perception
Gap, J. ACCT., Feb. 1986, at 70-74.
58. Bily, 834 P.2d at 763 (emphasis added; citation omitted). The court added that "the
auditor's role in the financial reporting process is secondary and the subject of complex professional
judgment ... . Id.
59. Id.
60. The Public Oversight Board, created in 1977 by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants to oversee and report on the Peer Review Program for firms that audit publicly held
entities, recently noted that the current liability system ignores-unfairly-the fact that "[the]
monetary benefit which accrues to accountants is minuscule in relation to the liability which can be
imposed if there is no reasonable limiting principle." AICPA PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BoARD, IN THE
PUBIUC INTEREST 5 (1993) [hereinafter POB REPORT].
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B. The Indeterminate Nature of "Recklessness" as Applied to the Audit
Function
Under the federal securities laws, a plaintiff seeking damages under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must show that the defendant has
used or employed "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance ... ,,6 Furthermore,
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission prohibits the use of "any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," the making of material misrepresenta-
tions, or omitting to disclose material facts in certain circumstances, or any act
that would "operate as a fraud or deceit" in the purchase or sale of a
security. 6
2
In Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder,6 the United States Supreme Court
addressed a long-standing question about the state of mind necessary to prove
a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Rejecting the contention that
liability could be predicated on a defendant's negligence, the Court held that
"scienter"-defined in a footnote as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud"-was a necessary element of a claim.'
The Court in Hochfelder specifically reserved the question whether a
reckless (versus merely negligent) misrepresentation or omission might satisfy
this requirement of scienter. Since then, however, most (but not all) courts
of appeal have determined that recklessness is sufficient to invoke liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. In theory, a standard of recklessness requires a
high degree of culpability-certainly much higher than mere negligence. But,
as noted by one commentator who has studied this issue in depth, the courts
have been
less than precise in defining what exactly constitutes a reckless
misrepresentation. That imprecision has resulted in ad hoc, if not
arbitrary, recklessness determinations. One judge may deem an
accused party to have acted recklessly, while a different judge in
another case may exonerate a defendant charged with nearly identical
misconduct. Over a decade of litigation has done precious little to
clarify the ambiguities. The result is that actual and potential parties
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
62. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1990).
63. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
64. Id. at 193 & n.12.
65. Id. On two occasions, the Supreme Court has since declined to decide whether recklessness
satisfies the scienter requirement. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.4
(1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980).
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to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions cannot predict with any degree
of certainty how a trier of fact will characterize challenged conduct
and thus whether it may serve as the basis for liability. Nor can
actors in securities transactions ensure that they take the steps
necessary to minimize the potential for liability."
Thus, legal practice in securities fraud cases does not neatly follow legal
theory. Once one moves beyond intentional fraud, which is relatively
obvious,' a clear bright line of demarcation dissolves. As Jake Netterville,
former Chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), writes: "There is no such sharp line separating an audit that failed
to detect a fraudulent scheme because the accountant acted recklessly from an
audit that failed to detect a fraud for a variety of other reasons."'
The very nature of an audit, as discussed above, compounds this serious
problem. For example, a jury presented with a case often confronts, with the
benefit of hindsight, a business problem that has caused a decline in the value
of a company's securities. Under these circumstances, every stage at which the
auditor exercised independent professional judgment is scrutinized. Juries, most
of whose members are unfamiliar with the subjectivity of financial statements
and the complexities of the audit function, naturally find it difficult to understand
why the auditor did not foresee the problem. It is easy to see how ordinary
good-faithjudgments might be improperly deemed reckless when the statements
turn out to be "inaccurate." In this environment, trying to distinguish between
innocent mistakes, negligence, even gross negligence-none of which is
actionable under Rule 10b-5-and recklessness is extremely difficult.'
66. Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 667, 674-75 (1991) (emphasis
added). Professor Johnson adds, based on his extensive analysis of the issue, that
the case law at times seems conclusory, if not largely incoherent. Reasoned and
principled distinctions are few and far between. . . . At one end of the spectrum, two
circuits apply the ominous sounding "severe" recklessness test. At the other end of the
spectrum, at least one court and for a time a court of appeals, endorses a standard that
seems little different from negligence. Between the extremes are a few opaque
variations of so-called recklessness standards. . . . "About all that can be said with
confidence is that 'the standard falls somewhere between intent and negligence.'"
Id. at 686-87, 695 (citations omitted).
67. Formulating a precise definition is a bit like seeking to define obscenity; while it is difficult
to arrive at the exact words that are adequate, as the late Justice Potter Stewart put it, "I know it
when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
68. Letter from Jake L. Netterville to Senator Christopher J. Dodd, 2-3 (Sept. 20, 1993)
[hereinafter Netterville Letter] (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).
69. These problems are illustrated well in a recent enforcement action brought by the SEC
against one accounting firm and described in Mr. Netterville's letter to Senator Dodd. In a case
arising out of a 1982 bankruptcy of one of the firm's clients, the SEC alleged a violation of Rule
lOb-5, asserting that the firm had acted recklessly in failing to comply with professional standards
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Quite simply, a bright line cannot be consistently drawn. As A.A.
Sommer, Jr., Chairman of the AICPA's independent Public Oversight Board,
recently testified, the distinction between recklessness and negligence in
securities fraud cases is honored more in the breach than in the observance. In
his words:
Now it's a debatable question, the problem of recklessness versus
negligence .... And that very confusion about the standards that are
applicable in an appropriate case is indicative of why you have the
problem with recklessness. Very often juries tend to view negligence
as recklessness because the standard is a very elusive one .... .'
Thus, "although the term 'recklessness' sounds like it encompasses only
extreme misconduct, recklessness is in practice an ill-defined label that can
be-and often is-erroneously applied to conduct that complies fully with
applicable professional standards or amounts to at most bare negligence. ,71
C. The "Deep Pocket" Auditor: Limitless Financial Exposure
As discussed above, the limits on recklessness that theoretically exist in the
classroom do not prevail when juries apply them in the courtroom. There, a
wide spectrum of conduct-some wrongful, some quite benign-is lumped
together as reckless. Significant in its own right, this problem is wildly
exacerbated because of the availability of joint and several liability. This rule
encourages the filing of lawsuits based on conduct short of true recklessness
merely to force settlements of those suits even when they are without merit.
The availability of joint and several liability has encouraged an explosion
of litigation against accountants, who are, in fact, sometimes the only deep
pockets left standing in the wake of a business failure. A decade ago, the
in auditing the company's 1980 financial statements. A federal district court rejected every claim
against the accounting firm, including the claim that the firm had acted recklessly. Instead, the court
found that the SEC's claims "involved complex issues of accounting as to which reasonable
accountants could reach different conclusions . . . . It follows that no finding of fraud or
recklessness can rationally be made in this case." SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217,
1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). As Mr. Netterville put it: "If the SEC, with all of its experience, can so
significantly misjudge an accountant's work, it is not surprising that juries of ordinary citizens can
be-and are-confused in deciding whether or not an accountant acted recklessly in connection with
a particular audit." Netterville Letter, supra note 68, at 5.
70. Private Litigation UnderFederal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on Securities, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 342 (1993) [hereinafter
Securities Hearings] (testimony of A.A. Sommer, Jr.).
71. Netterville Letter, supra note 68, at 1.
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Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Rosenblum v. Adler,' a privity matter,
clearly saw the rule as a means of shifting costs incurred by victims to society
as a whole through the large insurance cover carried by accountants. It is
telling-and ironic-that a principal justification for the public policy change
announced by this decision was the presumed ready availability of accountants'
liability insurance at a reasonable cost.73
But today, the comfortable assumption that individual economic losses can
be harmlessly transformed into social costs must be challenged. The insurance
cover has shrunk significantly and, for many firms, is virtually non-existent.
Litigation costs are thrown back upon individual shareholders and consumers
through higher prices for products and services. No policy doctrine can justify
the lopsided shift of liability without culpability that joint and several liability
permits.
In one of the seminal cases regarding accountants' liability, Judge Benjamin
Cardozo, while discussing privity, recognized as early as 1931 the harmful
consequences of overextending auditors' liability:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to
enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a
duty that exposes to these consequences. 4
The Bily court, expressing specific concern over "liability out of proportion to
fault,"" reached the same conclusion more than sixty years later:
An award of damages for pure economic loss suffered by third parties
raises the spectre of vast numbers of suits and limitless financial
72. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
73. Said the court:
Independent auditors have apparently been able to obtain liability insurance covering
these risks or otherwise to satisfy their financial obligations. We have no reason to
believe that they may not purchase malpractice insurance policies that cover their
negligent acts leading to misstatements relied upon by persons who receive the audit
from the company pursuant to a proper business purpose.
Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 151 (citation omitted). Reflecting the dramatic increase in litigation
exposure for the accounting profession during the past decade, the Bily court rejected this view. Bily
v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 764 (Cal. 1992).
74. Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (emphasis added).
75. Bily, 834 P.2d at 762.
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exposure .... The auditing CPA has no expertise in or control over
the products or services of its clients or their markets; it does not
choose the client's executives or make its business decisions; yet,
when clients fail financially, the CPA auditor is a prime target in
litigation claiming investor and creditor economic losses because it is
the only available (and solvent) entity that had any direct contact with
the client's business affairs.76
The Bily court concluded:
Given the secondary "watchdog" [as opposed to "bloodhound"] role
of the auditor, the complexity of the professional opinions rendered in
audit reports, and the difficult and potentially tenuous causal
relationships between audit reports and economic losses from
investment and credit decisions, the auditor exposed to negligence
claims from all foreseeable third parties faces potential liabilityfar out
of proportion to its fault."
A recent independent study confirms that the availability of an accounting
firm as a deep pocket defendant increases the expected value of a settlement.'
Based on an analysis of more than 100 shareholder class action settlements
between July 1991 and June 1993, two economists at National Economic
Research Associates, Inc., discovered that "the inclusion of law firms,
accounting firms or underwriters as codefendants adds over 50 percent to the
expected settlement value of a shareholder class action."' In the course of this
two-year period, the NERA study found that the average settlement in cases
involving an accounting firm was nearly double the settlement amount in cases
involving no accountants. The study concludes that, because no other
variable can explain this phenomenon, "[t]hese observations are consistent with
the hypothesis that settlement values are higher when more deep pockets are
involved," and with "the theory that settlement size is driven by the ability to
pay.81
By guaranteeing the availability of a "deep pocket" regardless of fault, joint
and several liability encourages plaintiffs' lawyers to file as many suits as
76. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
77. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 761 (Cal. 1992) (emphasis added).
78. FREDERICK C. DUNBAR & VINITA M. JUNEJA, RECENT TRENDS II: WHAT EXPLAINS
SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS (National Economic Research Assoc., Inc. 1993)
[hereinafter NERA STUDY].
79. Id. at ii.
80. Id. at 6, 15, Table 11.
81. Id. at6, 11.
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possible without regard to merit. Virtually all of these cases will settle and
produce a fee for plaintiffs' lawyers because the threat of joint and several
liability, the vagaries of the applicable legal standard, and the unpredictability
of the litigation make defendants settle even if they have a good defense. Thus,
each time a professional judgment is made in each audit, the auditor faces
potentially massive liability, because joint and several liability threatens a
defendant whose culpability is minimal with responsibility for the entire damage
award-which, in shareholder class action suits, can be extremely large.
IV. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY THREATENS THE
CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE AUDIT FUNCTION
What Judge Cardozo feared in Ultramares, and what the California
Supreme Court readily acknowledged in Bily, are unfortunately borne out all too
tangibly, particularly in federal securities litigation. The two factors discussed
above-a murky legal standard that threatens innocent accountants with the
prospect that their judgments will be viewed, in hindsight, as reckless; and a
liability standard that makes a marginally culpable defendant responsible for
100% of the damages-combine to force defendants to settle. The apparently
widespread assumption that there are costless remedies for any loss has led to
out-of-control litigation, especially with respect to Rule lOb-5 securities class
actions. The result is an enormous problem that threatens the future of the audit
function.
A. The Major Accounting Firms Face Massive Exposure in Litigation
The cost to the public accounting profession of insuring itself against
threatened legal action, and the high cost of defense and settlements, are large
and growing larger. At least one firm, the seventh-largest, has been forced into
extinction.' Insurance companies have rapidly and consistently withdrawn
from the market of insuring the profession.
Capable partners, facing unprecedented exposure of their life savings to
risk, are on the verge of leaving their chosen vocation. Retired partners fear the
loss of retirement benefits. It is more and more difficult for accounting firms,
operating as partnerships whose members' lifetime assets are vulnerable to
litigation, to attract and retain the "best and brightest" in their field. The
profession's independent Public Oversight Board warns of the consequences:
82. Laventhol & Horvath filed for bankruptcy on November 21, 1990. Alison L. Cowan,
Bankruptcy Filing By Laventhol, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1990, at D1.
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[T]he litigation risks confronting the profession pose serious dangers
to its ability to perform its assigned role in society .... There is
ample anecdotal evidence that the liability threat is a factor students
are now taking into account in determining whether to pursue a career
in public accounting. There have been instances of promising young
managers refusing partnerships... because of concerns with exposing
their personal assets to litigation risks. There have also been instances
in which these concerns were important factors in the decision of
partners to leave public accounting for corporate positions.83
An understanding of the accounting profession's litigation exposure
illustrates all too well the reasons behind these disquieting trends. As the six
largest firms reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission in June 1993,
currently pending claims against them of more than $30 billion represent more
than twenty times the combined partners' capital in all six firms. 4
Furthermore, a rising percentage of accounting firms' audit and accounting
revenues is now devoured by litigation costs. It is the fastest-growing expense
of the six largest firms, increasing by nearly fifty percent during the past two
years. Net practice protection costs8 5 now equal almost eleven percent of the
six firms' accounting and audit revenues-or, on average, nearly $100 million
per firm in 1992 alone. Table I below illustrates these costs.86
83. POB REPORT, supra note 60, at 9.
84. This material and that which follows were submitted to the SEC on June 11, 1993, in
response to questions from Chief Accountant Walter Schuetze. See A Disproportionate Burden of
Liability, Report of the Six Firms to SEC Chief Accountant Walter Schuetze (June 11, 1993)
[hereinafter First SEC Submission]. The data were collected from the accounting profession's six
largest firms: Arthur Andersen & Co., Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young,
KPMG Peat Marwick, and Price Waterhouse. The six firms use different fiscal years and different
accounting classifications. In compiling the firms' collective data, therefore, some judgments were
required to arrive at the most consistent presentation possible. Additional material was also
submitted in a follow-up letter to Mr. Schuetze on September 24, 1993 [hereinafter Second SEC
Submission]. (The First and Second SEC Submission reports are on file with the SEC's Office of
Chief Accountant.)
85. For purposes of this analysis, accounting and audit practice protection costs include liability
insurance, plus accounting and audit judgments and settlements, outside legal fees, and the direct
cost of internal legal departments, net of insurance recoveries.
86. First SEC Submission, supra note 84, at 2.
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Table I. Accounting and Audit Practice Protection Costs
(in millions)
1990 1991 1992
Gross accounting and audit revenues $5,257 $5,319 $5,470
Costs of judgments, settlements, and legal defense $367 $485 $783
Gross costs as percentage of revenues 7.0% 9.1% 14.3%
Insurance premiums net of insurance recoveries $37 $(8) $(185)
(credit)
Net audit practice protection costs $404 $477 $598
Net costs as percentage of revenues 7.7% 9.0% 10.9%
As Table I shows, actual litigation costs, before considering the impact of
insurance, have more than doubled over the past two years. These costs now
represent more than fourteen percent of the six firms' accounting and audit
revenues. If today's trend continues as expected, litigation costs will have
absorbed an even higher percentage of revenues in 1993. These costs to the
accounting profession are far greater than similar costs incurred by any other
American business or profession except small aircraft manufacturers-before
most of them abandoned the business.
s7
Because insurers must charge higher premiums to make up for prior losses,
the firms entered 1993 facing major built-in higher charges against future
earnings, along with extremely high deductibles and reduced coverage.
Inexorably, the situation is deteriorating to a point where the profession may be
altogether unable to obtain commercial insurance, because no insurer will be
willing to underwrite the litigation risk involved.
Furthermore, in addition to the exploding practice protection costs
summarized in Table I, there is a heavy additional cost in time and talent
diverted from the principal mission of the six firms' auditing practices-
providing the investing public with assurance regarding the reliability of the
financial information that corporate managements disclose. When a lawsuit is
brought, the attention of management personnel directly associated with the audit
in question-from the office managing partner to the line auditors-must focus
87. U.S. production ofgeneral-aviation aircraft fell to 880 planes in 1992 from a peak of17,811
in 1978, and it is reported that "lawsuits helped send the small-plane business into a death spiral."
William M. Bulkeley, Small-Plane Makers May Get a Big Lift from Congress, WALL ST. J., Oct.
19, 1993, at BI.
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on defending the lawsuit. Given the considerable number of suits the firms face,
the diversion of human resources is substantial.
Litigation, in particular, consumes a significant portion of senior
management's time. For example, one firm's Vice Chairman of Accounting and
Auditing estimates that litigation-related matters absorb at least twenty percent
of his time-time lost from his primary responsibilities to respond to the needs
of users of financial statements by developing new audit methodologies and
consulting on complex financial reporting matters." All six firms share similar
experiences: litigation management claims too much attention, detracting from
their ability to improve the way they fulfill their mission.
The six firms' litigation-related costs not only are growing enormously,
they are far higher than similar costs to other professions and businesses. One
study estimates that U.S. tort costs consume 2.3 % of our country's annual gross
domestic product.89 The cost to the six firms, seen in Table I, is more than
four times larger, although there is absolutely no evidence that the profession's
performance is substandard in comparison to other economic sectors. To the
contrary, objective measures-numbers of government enforcement actions,
results of the AICPA peer review process, and studies of the auditor's effect on
financial reporting-all indicate that the profession's work is of high quality.
B. The Cost of Defending the Large Number of Meritless Cases Is
Disproportionately High When Compared to the Accountants'
Level of Responsibility
The major accounting firms incur tremendous defense costs, and are forced
to pay settlements, in numerous cases that are without merit. The low
settlements, in comparison to the damages claimed, or outright dismissals in
these cases demonstrate that the accountants had little or no responsibility for the
alleged misconduct. Yet the threat of joint and several liability, together with
rapidly escalating legal costs, made settlements a virtual necessity.
88. First SEC Submission, supra note 84, at 3.
89. This study by Tillinghast, a Towers Perrin Company, reports that the cost of the U.S. tort
system-at 2.3 % of the GDP-is approximately two and one-half times the average relative cost of
tort systems in major European countries as well as in Australia and Japan. TORT COST TRENDS:
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 14 (Tillinghast 1992) [hereinafter Tillinghast]. Further, tort costs
in other major nations show negligible growth, compared with a U.S. cost spiral since 1983. Id.
at 15.
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The information gathered by the six firms leaves no doubt that meritless
claims impose very large-and disproportionate-costs on accounting firms. A
survey by the six largest firms of the cases against them involving Rule 10b-5
claims that were concluded in fiscal year 1991 showed that (1) the average claim
subjecting the firm to joint and several liability was for $83 million; (2) the
average judgment or settlement by the firm was $2.7 million; yet (3) the average
legal cost the firms paid per claim was $3.5 million.' In other words, in the
average case concluded in 1991, a major accounting firm paid $800,000 more
in legal defense costs than in settlement payout-which itself, on average, is a
mere three percent of the original claim, suggesting that the claim had little or
no merit.
The gross data submitted by the six largest accounting firms to the SEC
further confirm that accountants are frequently victimized by meritless suits.9'
In 1992, for instance, the six largest firms closed sixty-two audit-related cases
involving Rule lOb-5 claims. Of these sixty-two cases, twenty-five were
dismissed before trial. Those twenty-five cases completely vindicated the
accounting firms that defended their audits. But vindication did not come
cheaply: the six firms spent more than $10 million successfully defending those
twenty-five cases. Another eleven of the 1992 cases were settled for $150,000
or less. Such a small payment essentially represents no more than the nuisance
value of the suit. In order to achieve this result, however, the firms spent over
$8 million more in defense costs for these eleven cases.' Thus, even the
weakest Rule lob-5 lawsuit entails substantial defense costs. And the costs just
discussed were all incurred in cases resolved before trial. The cost of
proceeding to trial in cases like this is simply prohibitive.
It is not surprising, then, that Robert Levine, former CEO of Laventhol &
Horvath, the seventh-largest U.S. accounting firm when it filed for bankruptcy
in 1990, said at the time, with respect to the burden of securities fraud claims:
"'It wasn't the litigation we could lose that was the problem. It was the cost of
winning that caused the greatest part of our financial distress.'" 93 Like other
large accounting firms, according to Levine, Laventhol was sued repeatedly
because of the perception of it being a deep pocket, not because it failed to meet
its professional responsibilities. 4 One study found that eighty percent of the
90. 138 CONG. REC. S12604 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen. Sanford (D-NC),
introducing Securities Private Enforcement Act of 1992).
91. First SEC Submission, supra note 84, at 3-4.
92. Id.
93. Editorial, Looking Back, PUBUC ACCOUNTING REPORT, SPECIAL REPORT, Nov. 30, 1991,
at 2 (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).
94. Id.
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cases against Laventhol settled for nuisance value or less. 5 The cost of
defending countless meritless suits simply proved too much for Laventhol to
bear.
Tables II, III, IV, and V-which are drawn from data presented by the six
largest accounting firms to the SEC-illustrate the inordinate resources
consumed by this litigation." Table II describes the six firms' total audit-
related litigation experience over the past three years. Tables III, IV, and V
show the firms' combined experience with certain types of lawsuits, including
federal securities claims.
Table II. Audit-Related Litigation, All Cases
1990 1991 1992
Total amount of awards and settlements paid' $89.6 M $160.3 M $752.4 M
Amount of awards and settlements per audit $19,865 $37,900 $185,737
partner
Number of cases settled 52 67 115
Amount of settlements" $54.4 M $146.6 M $748.3 M
Number of cases dismissed 23 29 79
Number of cases tried 9 7 15
Number of verdicts for defendants 3 3 12
Number of verdicts for plaintiffs 6 4 3
Total amount of awards to plaintiffs* $35.2 M $13.7 M $4.1 M
These amounts represent the total awards and settlements in cases closed in the years indicated
regardless of when the firms recorded the specific amounts in their income statements. Hence, these
figures do not relate consistently to the figures in Table I.
95. Id.
96. First SEC Submission, supra note 84, at 14 (Table ), 16 (Table III). Second SEC
Submission, supra note 84, at 6 (Table IV), 9 (Table V).
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Table III. Audit-Related Cases Including 10b-5 Claims
1990 1991 1992
Total amount of awards and settlements paid $58.5 M $85.3 M $373.8 M
Amount of awards and settlements per audit $13,964 $20,166 $92,278
partner
Number of cases settled 12 24 35
Amount of settlements $36.5 M $77.3 M $373.8 M
Number of cases dismissed 7 11 23
Number of cases tried 1 4 0
Number of verdicts for defendants 0 3 0
Number of verdicts for plaintiffs 1 1 0
Total amount of awards to plaintiffs $22.0 M $8.0 M $0
Includes all cases that contain a Rule l0b-S claim, even if other federal and state claims were also
alleged in the complaint. There is a minuscule number of cases, not included in this table, thatare
brought in federal court but that do not involve a Rule 10b-S claim.
Table IV. Audit-Related Cases Where Rule 10b-5 Claims Are the Only
Federal Securities Law Claims
1990 1991 1992
Total amount of awards and settlements paid $19.3 M $15.0 M $234.3 M
Amount of awards and settlements per audit $4,278 $3,546 $57,838
partner
Number of cases settled 5 15 19
Amount of settlements $19.3 M $7.0 M $234.3 M
Number of cases dismissed 5 7 14
Number of cases tried 0 2 0
Number of verdicts for defendants 0 1 0
Number of verdicts for plaintiffs 0 1 0
Total arnount of awards to plaintiffs $0 $8.0 M $0
Includes all cases containing Rule 10b-5 claims, even if the complaint also alleged other non-
securities federal or state claims.
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Table V. Audit-Related Cases Containing Only State Law Claims,
with No Claims Under Federal Securities Laws
1990 1991 1992
Total amount of awards and settlements paid $31.1 M $72.8 M $378.5 M
Amount of awards and settlements per audit $6,894 $17,210 $93,434
partner
Number of cases settled 39 40 78
Amount of settlements $17.9 M $67.1 M $374.4 M
Number of cases dismissed 16 18 54
Number of cases tried 8 3 15
Number of verdicts for defendants 3 0 12
Number of verdicts for plaintiffs 5 3 3
Total amount of awards to plaintiffs $13.2 M $5.7 M $4.1
Includes all cases containing nofederal securities law claim, even if the complaint also alleged other
federal clains.
These data clearly show the "hydraulic" pressure forcing settlements due
to the threat of joint and several liability, particularly in Rule lOb-5 class action
suits (where the vague "recklessness" standard has created so much litigation
uncertainty). In fact, while actions under Rule lOb-5 represent less than thirty
percent of the total cases closed in 1990, 1991, and 1992, they account for more
than fifty percent of the firms' settlement payments during that period.' This
heavy pressure to settle imposes an in terrorem effect on defendants whose
connection to the alleged principal wrongdoing is tenuous or remote.
Defendants believe they have little choice, even if the claims against them are
relatively empty. Due to the risks and costs of litigation, then-SEC Chairman
Richard Breeden remarked that "companies settle weak or even meritless claims
on essentially the same terms as they settle meritorious claims.""
Conversely, many more state than federal claims went to trial-another
indication of the extraordinary pressure on defendants facing joint and several
liability to settle Rule lOb-5 actions. The reason is simple: the cost of
proceeding to trial is prohibitive, even if the accountant's legal position is quite
97. Id. at 3.
98. Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at the
Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago, Illinois 8 (Oct. 16, 1991) [hereinafter Breeden Remarks] (on
file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).
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strong, because potential responsibility for the entire amount of damages is so
great. In this respect, the doctrine of joint and several liability "actually
encourages plaintiffs' lawyers to ignore the merits of their case and sue every
potentially liable party with deep pockets, even if the party was not involved in
the fraud."'
Significantly, the only academic study to examine federal securities fraud
litigation against accountants found that auditors are more frequently dismissed
from a case, or make a very low payment, than other types of defendants.
Professor Zoe-Vonna Palmrose of the University of Southern California found
that "the evidence [with respect to Rule 10b-5 claims] was consistent with
meaningful levels of weak litigation. This finding applied to all defendants, but
was much more applicable to auditors than to all other defendants. 100
Moreover, because the data indicate a "high cost" to auditors of defending
against these weak cases, "the evidence supports auditors' arguments that they
bear a disproportionate share of litigation costs.",0'
C. The Problem Is Large, and Growing Larger
During the past five years, the number of shareholder class actions against
accountants and others has escalated considerably, as reported by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. In 1988, there were 108 filings,
while in 1992 that number had reached 268." These statistics paint an
alarming picture, as more cases were filed in the past three years than in the
previous seven years combined, and the number in each of the three years was
more than double the number in nearly any of the earlier years. 03
Far more important than the raw number of cases filed, however, is their
profile. Rather than being ordinary business disputes between two parties, these
cases are among the largest actions in the federal judicial system. The data are
compelling. A conservative projection of the damages sought in the 268 class
actions suits filed in just one year, 1992, amounts to $10.7 billion, and those
cases involved an estimated 734,000 separate claimants. Similarly, the cases
99. Netterville Letter, supra note 68, at 7.
100. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, The Joint and Several Versus Proportionate Liability Debate: An
Empirical InvestigationofTotal Resolutions on Audit-Related Litigation 27 (Sept. 1993) (preliminary
draft, on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).
101. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
102. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 121 (statement of William R. McLucas).
103. Id. The Securities Class Action Alert estimates that "total cash settlements of shareholder
class action lawsuits against companies of all sizes nearly quintupled to $1.55 billion in 1992 from
$324 million in 1988. In the same period, the number of suits settled jumped to 144 from 53, and
the average cash settlement increased to $10.8 million from $6.1 million." Brent Bowers & Udayan
Gupta, Shareholder Suits Beset Small Companies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1994, at BI.
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pending in 1992 carried claims of more than $25 billion and involved an
estimated 1.7 million claimants."° 4  The problem is growing, too. The
monetary value of these lawsuits, for instance, adjusted for inflation, has
ballooned by sixty-six percent over the past fifteen years. (This figure was
derived by comparing average settlements in 1974-75 with those in 1989-
90.)Os The unproductive impact of these suits on the economy has thus grown
dramatically.
Even the American Bar Association, not necessarily an advocate for
accountants, in a letter to Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Representative Ron
Wyden (D-Or.), commenting on the latter's proposed Financial Fraud Detection
and Disclosure Act, stated that:
[P]rivate actions against CPA firms under the federal securities laws
are currently instituted at the slightest provocation .... The liability
exposure currently faced by CPA firms is not only real and
substantial, but it is also having a material adverse impact on the
accounting profession. It is no secret that each of the large accounting
firms is currently facing multiple claims for hundreds of millions of
dollars. At the same time, liability insurance coverage is diminishing.
As a result, the six largest firms are no longer able to" litigate
securities law class actions to a final resolution since an adverse
outcome could be life-threatening.'06
D. American Businesses May Lose the Services of Accounting Firms
In 1992, the California Supreme Court in Bily expressed concern that
expanded accountants' liability would cause "deleterious economic effects."" 7
Rejecting the claim by the Rosenblum court that expanded auditor liability would
promote significant improvement in auditing, the Bily court said that "[i]n view
of the inherent dependence of the auditor on the client and the labor-intensive
nature of auditing, we doubt whether audits can be done in ways that would
yield significantly greater accuracy without disadvantages."" Presciently, the
court added:
104. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 720, 726 (letter from American Business
Conference, American Electronics Association, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Association of Publicly Traded Companies, and National Venture Capital Association to Senator
Christopher Dodd).
105. id. at 723.
106. Letter from ABA Section of Business Law to Sen. John Kerry and Rep. Ron Wyden 5-6
(July 2, 1993) [hereinafter ABA Letter] (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).
107. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 765 (Cal. 1992).
108. Id. at 766.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [1994], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss3/3
1994] PROPORTIONALITY 899
Auditors may rationally respond to increased liability by simply
reducing audit services in fledgling industries where the business
failure rate is high, reasoning that they will inevitably be singled out
and sued when their client goes into bankruptcy regardless of the care
or detail of their audits. As a legal economist described the problem:
"mhe stronger the probability that liability will be incurred when
performance is adequate, the weaker is the deterrent effect of liability
rules. Why offer a higher quality product if you will be sued
regardless whenever there is a precipitous decline in stock
prices? ,,""
The Bily court's prediction has proven correct. The chain reaction of
negative effects on American business from the current class action system
includes the advent of more-stringent risk management programs by audit firms.
Managing risk now focuses on vulnerability to litigation, not only on the ability
to perform a quality audit. Consequently, many promising but higher-risk
companies are beginning to be deprived of the best professional expertise."0
This often occurs at the most promising but vulnerable moments in a
business's life. One large accounting firm, for example, has decided in the past
year to refuse well more than twenty opportunities to prepare clients for initial
public offerings of their securities."' Another firm chose to walk away from
major portions of its banking practice, at an especially difficult period for the
industry." 2 In general, due to litigation exposure, there is unwillingness today
to offer new services that could be extremely helpful, such as association with
expanded disclosure of risks and uncertainties and reporting on prospective
financial information." 
3
109. Id. (emphasis added; citation omitted).
110. As recently noted, the "[aivailability of [a]ccounting [i]nformation is [c]ritical to
[s]moothly [flunctioning [c]apital [m]arkets .... If auditors are forced to riddle their audit opinions
with disclaimers to stave off liability, securities analysts will lose a valuable source of information
that is critical to price predictions. Consequently, without the widespread availability of financial
information, securities pricing would become less predictable. . . ." David A. Jaffe, The Allocation
of Fault in Auditor Liability Lawsuits Brought by Sophisticated Third Party Users of Financial
Statements-A Plea for Proportionate Liability, 54 U. PIr. L. REv. 1051, 1079 (1993).
111. This raises the cost of capital for such companies. As a result,
banks and private equity investors will be less willing to commit funds to companies that
are unable to retain independent auditors. Where investment capital can be obtained,
it will be more expensive because investors will require a higher rate of return as
compensation for the additional risk engendered by lack of adequate financial disclosure.
Id. at 1082.
112. Vincent Michael Valce, Ernst & Young Closing Its CT Banking Practice, BANKER &
TRADESMAN, May 1993.
113. Kelly Holland & Larry Light, Big Six Finms are Firing Clients, BUS. WEEK, Mar. I, 1993,
at 76-77.
Mednick and Peck: Proportionality: A Much-Needed Solution to the Accountants' Legal
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994
900 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
In fact, growing numbers of smaller accounting firms in recent years have
stopped performing audits altogether. A recent survey of California CPA firms
found that only fifty-three percent will undertake audit work-and, among those
firms, thirty-two percent are discontinuing audits in what they consider to be
high-risk economic sectors.1 4 Similarly, a study by insurance consultants
Johnson & Higgins found that fifty-six percent of the mid-sized accounting firms
they surveyed refuse to do business with clients in industries the firms judge to
be high-risk.l 5
In sum, as the American Bar Association's Section of Business Law
recently observed with alarm:
[A]I1 of the "Big Six" firms are currently reassessing their clientele
and are terminating audit clients where they perceive the liability risks
to be disproportionately large in relation to the associated fee income
... . The trend is even stronger with respect to small and medium
size CPA firms, many of which are abandoning SEC practice (and, in
some cases, all audit practice). A recent poll by a task force of the
California State Society of CPAs showed a significant drop
(approximately 6%) over a two-year period in the number of CPA
firms engaged in audit practice . . . . In short, the accounting
profession simply cannot withstand any further increase in its liability
exposure if it is to continue to audit the financial statements of public
companies."6
V. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY'S ADVERSE ECONOMIC EFFECTS REACH
WELL BEYOND THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
A. The Current System Fails to Compensate Shareholders Fairly
It is not only the accounting profession that has suffered as a result of joint
and several liability. The hard fact is that the current liability system does not
protect investors, despite its historical origins in exactly this policy impulse.
Three investors' representatives who recently testified before the Securities
Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee all made precisely this
point. One of them, Maryellen Andersen of the Connecticut State Retirement
and Trust Funds, said that reform "must be addressed to ensure that the system
114. Lee Berton, Legal Liability Awards Are Frightening Small CPA Firms Away from Audits,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1992, at BI.
115. THE JOHNSON & HIGGINS FINANCIAL GROUP, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT: HOW THE PROFESSION Is RESPONDING (1990).
116. ABA Letter, supra note 106, at 6.
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protects us as investors, employees, retirees and citizens. " t7 Ralph
Whitworth, who as executive director of the United Shareholders' Association
spoke for 65,000 investors, charged that our system of private rights of action
for securities fraud has evolved into a game of "gotcha" litigation punctuated by
wars of legal attrition."" And Patricia Reilly, a plaintiff in two Rule lOb-5
class action cases, asserted that "security class action lawsuits exist for the
benefit of the shareholders' lawyers. The stockholders, the victim of the fraud,
recover virtually none of their losses."119
The views of these investors about today's malfunctioning system should
be given great weight. After all, the federal securities laws and Rule lOb-5 in
particular were designed to protect investors. Yet their sworn testimony,
together with numerous research studies, confirms that the litigation system is
not effectively compensating investors who are truly injured by fraud.
1. Investors Recover Very Little of Their Alleged Damages
Research findings put dollars and cents on the charge that today's system
does not truly compensate investors. Professor Janet Cooper Alexander's study
of class actions against smaller high-tech companies in Silicon Valley, for
example, found an average settlement rate of twenty-six cents on the dollar-
with twenty-seven percent subtracted from that amount to pay attorneys'
fees."2 Furthermore, a broader National Economic Research Associates study
of shareholder class action settlements between July 1991 and June 1993 showed
that investors recover only approximately seven cents on the dollar before an
award of attorneys' fees. Finally, a comprehensive 1993 study led by Dr.
Vincent O'Brien found a median recovery rate to investors of only four cents on
the dollar. 121
117. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 324 (testimony of Maryellen Andersen).
118. Id. at 364 (statement of Ralph Whitworth).
119. Id. at 45 (testimony of Patricia Reilly).
120. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 507-519 (1991).
121. NERA STUDY, supra note 78, at 4; VINCENT E. O'BRIEN & RICHARD W. HODGES, A
STUDY OF CLASS ACTION SECURITIES FRAUD CASES 1988-1993, at 11-3 (1993). More specifically,
the NERA study showed that 84 settlements in cases involving total investor losses of approximately
$17.8 billion generated only approximately $547 million in settlements (6.98%). NERA STUDY,
supra note 78, at 4, Table 6.
In a letter to Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), the State of Wisconsin Investment Board, which
serves as investment manager for pension funds of public employees in Wisconsin and which
manages more than $33 billion, noted that a sampling of its files of shareholder class actions in
which its has been involved showed that "cases settled for an average of approximately 11 % of the
total amount of plaintiff damages certified to the court. In one instance, the recovery was only 1%
of certified loss .... Attorney fees and costs consistently take the lion's share of recoveries in
situations where plaintiffs go largely uncompensated for their losses." Letter from Kurt N. Schacht
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Well-known class action attorney William Lerach, at one of the 1993
Securities Subcommittee hearings, asserted that the average settlement rate is
actually sixty cents on the dollar, calling the other studies faulty because they
compared the settlement amount to the plaintiffs entire market loss-not to the
(smaller) damages that a plaintiff could recover. But a study of the twenty cases
cited by Mr. Lerach, which he characterized as a "representative sample" of
securities class actions, contradicts his assertion. The average settlement amount
in those cases was only twenty-three percent of the legally recoverable damages.
Moreover, where attorney fee information was available (thirteen of the twenty
cases cited by Mr. Lerach), the study found that the plaintiffs' attorneys
received, on average, thirty-nine percent of the settlement fund in fees and
expenses. Thus, the recovery that actually reached the investor/plaintiffs-
determined by subtracting from the settlement amount the fees and expenses
awarded to the plaintiffs' attorneys-was only about fourteen percent of the
legally recoverable damages.122  Plainly, such meager compensation is
inadequate for true victims of fraud.
For a sad but typical illustration, take the case of Patricia Reilly, who has
been a class member in two different cases. The first, against Pace Membership
Warehouse, settled for $9,125,000. Attorneys for the class sought a fee of forty
percent of the settlement, plus a further $600,000 in expenses. After Ms. Reilly
traveled at her own expense from California to Colorado to challenge the fee,
the court awarded the attorneys roughly thirty percent of the settlement-
$3,300,000. The shareholders will receive an estimated fifteen to seventeen
cents for every dollar they lost. In the second case, against Tucson Electric,
Ms. Reilly fared even less well. The company settled for $30 million. The
class's attorneys, claiming rates up to $500 per hour, walked away from the
case with $7,845,000-which included a $4.8 million premium above their total
billings. One of the plaintiffs' attorneys told Ms. Reilly that class members can
expect to receive only four or five cents on their lost dollars."2
The plainspoken Ms. Reilly, who also testified before Senator Dodd's
subcommittee, wonders:
to Senator Pete Domenici 1, 2 (Sept. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Schacht Letter] (on file with the
Valparaiso University Law Review).
122. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 708 (letter from Mark Gitenstein to Martha Cochran
(Aug. 6, 1993)). It should also be noted that NERA's analysis of the relation between market loss
and plaintiffs' damage estimates (NERA STUDY, supra note 78, at 7) supports the credibility of this
critique of Mr. Lerach's approach.
123. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 44-45 (testimony of Patricia Reilly).
Ms. Reilly concluded: "As a stockholder, I feel that the lawyers use the stockholders as
stepping stones, preying on their misfortune, as a means to file a lawsuit that will inevitably settle,
in which the lawyers will reap millions in fees while their clients recover pennies on the dollars of
their losses." Id. at 132.
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[F]or whose benefit are these lawsuits brought and then settled? ...
[I]t only stands to reason that 96 % of the cases settle. It is in the best
interest of the lawyers to settle. If the case goes to trial and the
shareholders lose . . . the shareholders' lawyers do not get anything.
Of course, if the case settles, the shareholders still get virtually
nothing, but at least their lawyers make millions .... [T]he suits are
really brought so that the lawyers can suck money out of insurance
companies. "
2. Plaintiffs' Class Action Counsel Have an Inherent Conflict of Interest
Part of the economic burden on investors in shareholder class actions
emerges from the lawyers' role. Plaintiffs' attorneys in these cases receive only
minimal monitoring from their ostensible clients. Essentially, these attorneys
function "as entrepreneurs who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk
and exercise nearly plenary control over all important decisions in the
lawsuit."" The attorney, not the client, controls the litigation, and "the
124. Id. at 136 (testimony of Patricia Reilly). Some critics of reform in shareholder class
action litigation argue that the requirement for court approval of settlements safeguards against
inadequate settlement amounts and outrageous attorneys' fees. But this argument displays little
understanding of the reality of the judicial process today. Since few plaintiffs have adequate
incentives to undertake the time-consuming expense of following the case closely or challenging the
settlement, court approval is essentially a rubber stamp. As two legal scholars put it:
lJIudicial approval appears to be highly imperfect as a protection .. . for several
reasons. First, and most important, the judge herself has a powerful interest in
approving the settlement. Judges' calendars are crowded ... [and] the workload only
seems to increase. If the judge approves the settlement, the result will be to remove a
potentially complex and time-consuming case from the judge's calendar; if she rejects
it she faces a substantial probability of further litigation. A judge faces virtually no
prospect of reversal for approving a settlement, whereas a decision rejecting a settlement
might well be appealed. Moreover, trial judges are heavily conditioned by the ethos of
their jobs to view settlements as desirable...
[S]ettlement hearings are typically pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs'
counsel and defense counsel. Because both parties desire that the settlement be
approved, they have every incentive to present it as entirely fair.
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv.
1, 45-46 (1991).
The courts want to approve settlements because anything that reduces their crowded dockets
is helpful. If the suit is meritless and the defendant settles for nuisance value, no one has an
incentive to challenge the settlement: the defendant has judged it less expensive to settle than to seek
vindication at trial, and the plaintiffs are getting an unexpected windfall, even if a small one.
Furthermore, approval of a low settlement may signify the court's view that the case has relatively
little merit. If the settlement is too low relative to the damages suffered, the defendant and the
plaintiffs' lawyers will be satisfied, while plaintiffs as individuals each have too little at stake to
spend the money required to challenge the settlement in person.
125. Macey & Miller, supra note 124, at 3.
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identified plaintiff operates almost always as a mere figurehead.""2 Indeed,
"it is clear that the current system gives plaintiffs' attorneys a far greater interest
in shareholder class actions than any of the plaintiffs they represent. This
creates an inherent conflict of interest . . . . Plaintiffs' attorneys are clearly in
the drivers seat."' 27
William McLucas, enforcement director of the SEC, recently testified to the
same point, asserting that "class action counsel tends to operate in an
entrepreneurial capacity rather than as a fiduciary operating at the direction of
the client." l" Mark Griffin of the North American Securities Administrators
Association testified similarly, with understatement, that "there may be an
inherent conflict in the attorney-client relationship in class action suits which
goes somewhat unchecked by ethical concerns, because of the large amounts of
money involved."":  In fact, in a recent interview in Forbes magazine,
126. Id. at 5. As Ralph Whitworth put it: "[T he client's role is being overtaken or supplanted
by people whose interests diverge radically from that of the clients." Securities Hearings, supra
note 70, at 364 (testimony of Ralph Whitwotth).
127. Schacht Letter, supra note 121, at 1-2.
128. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 117 (statement of William R. McLucas).
129. Id. at 53 (testimony of Mark Griffin).
Given this reality, it is not surprising that outright abuses occur in shareholder class action
cases. For example, so-called "cookie cutter" complaints are brought within days (or even hours)
of the announcement of bad corporate news or an adverse stock movement; obviously, the time is
too short to permit any investigation of whether fraud occurred. Such claims are brought by only
a handful of firms that have perfected the techniques involved-to the point of computer-tracking
stock prices in order to generate nearly instantaneous complaints linked to price movements. One
federal judge in New York recently dismissed a batch of similar complaints alleging that an
investment company made misrepresentations in placement memoranda it offered to investors:
The court is confronted with 27 equally frivolous complaints filed by the same law
firm . . . . It appears . . . as if the complaints were spun out of a word-processed
original, with little attention to the details ....
Each complaint is as groundless as the next .... Indeed, it seems impossible that
the drafters of these complaints could have read the memoranda. If they had . . . they
would have discovered that their allegations were entirely frivolous.
Kushner v. DBG Property Investors, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 1161, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). This was
no isolated instance. Of 46 cases that the National Law Journal studied, 12 were filed within one
day and another 30 within one week of publication of unfavorable news about the defendant
company. Milt Policzer, They've Cornered the Market, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 27, 1992, at 1, 34.
Philips N.V., a Dutch electronics giant traded on the New York Stock Exchange, was named in a
class action suit "just hours" after announcing that its 1992 operating profit was unlikely to match
its 1991 profit of $566 million. Bloomberg Business News, Philips Sued on Prospects for Earnings,
N. Y. TIMEs, June 18, 1992, at D4. Compaq Computer Corp. was sued one day after announcing
a drop in earnings; it took Apple Computer six days to receive the same treatment after a similar
announcement. Common sense suggests that anyone who files suit within hours or days of such
complex events has not investigated the facts, let alone reached the level of scrutiny needed to find
a reasonable basis for alleging fraud.
The use of "professional plaintiffs" is also widespread. Harry Lewis, a retired lawyer, has
reportedly been lead plaintiff in an estimated 300 to 400 lawsuits; William Weinberger, a retired
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plaintiffs' class action attorney William Lerach brashly noted, "'I have the
greatest practice of law in the world: I have no clients.""'
Since plaintiffs' lawyers work on a contingency basis in a wide variety of
actions, the unique attorney's conflict of interest in shareholder class actions
cannot be blamed on the contingency arrangement alone. As one legal scholar
and former federal official notes: "The principal difference lies in the fact that
in a substantial number of class action cases the lawyer will be more prone to
settle than would the class, whereas in other contingent fee situations such a
difference in view between client and lawyer is less likely."'
Judge Henry Friendly, longtime chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, effectively summarized this unique conflict of interest
for plaintiffs' attorneys:
There can be no blinking at the fact that the interests of the
plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit and of his attorney are by no
means congruent. While, in a general sense, both are interested in
maximizing the recovery, this is only a half-truth. Even apart from
special considerations which . . .may cause special divergence of
interest in cases where extremely large amounts are at stake, . . .
there is a difference in every case. The plaintiff's financial interest is
in his share of the total recovery less what may be awarded to counsel,
simpliciter; counsel's financial interest is in the amount of the award
to him less the time and effort needed to produce it. A relatively
small settlement may well produce an allowance bearing a higher ratio
to the cost of the work than a much larger recovery obtained only after
extensive discovery, a long trial and an appeal. The risks in
proceeding to trial vary even more essentially. For the plaintiff, a
defendant's judgment may mean simply the defeat of an expectation,
often of relatively small amount; for his lawyer it can mean the loss
of years of costly effort by himself and his staff. In this respect a
derivative action is in a quite different posture from a personal injury
action conducted on a contingent basis. We say this not in criticism
accountant, has been a plaintiff in more than 90 suits. In Los Angeles, surgeon Steven Cooperman
has appeared as a plaintiff in 19 suits, but he must yield the local title to Rodney Shields, a retired
lawyer, who has made 20 Los Angeles appearances as a plaintiff in securities suits. See Policzer,
supra, at 1, 34; see also Andrew Leigh, Being a Plaintiff Sometimes Amounts to a Profession,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 1, 1991, at 8; Nancy Rutter, Securities Class Action Scandal,
UPSIDE, Apr. 1990, at 16-17, 32.
130. William P. Barrett, I Have No Clients, FORBES, Oct. 11, 1993, at 52.
131. Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of
Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 57 (1975).
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but in simple recognition of the facts of class action life.
3 2
Thus, most cases settle because plaintiffs' attorneys have an inherent
bias toward settlement that meshes well with the coercive effect of joint and
several liability on deep pocket defendants who have been joined to a particular
case solely for their settlement value. And, in general, the earlier the
settlement, the more the attorneys will profit:
Attorneys compensated on a percentage method have an incentive to
settle early for an amount lower than what might be obtained by
further efforts. The attorney who puts in relatively few hours to
obtain an early settlement is likely to earn a much greater
compensation per hour of effort than an attorney who expends greater
efforts and litigates a case to the point where the plaintiffs' recovery
is maximized. Again, the plaintiff class loses.'33
B. Investors and the National Economy Pay Too Much for Litigation Abuses
Investors are damaged by abusive litigation not only when they fail to gain
adequate compensation. When companies in which they hold equity incur
inordinately high expenses fighting frivolous suits, the value of investors'
holdings suffers. Beyond that, of course, the long-term health of the entire
economy is compromised. Ms. Andersen eloquently summarized these harmful
effects in her testimony:
[We investors] are the ones who are hurt if a system allows someone
to force us to spend huge sums of money in legal costs by merely
paying ten dollars and filing a meritless cookie cutter complaint against
a company or its accountant, when that plaintiff is disappointed in his
or her investment . . . . If we saddle our companies with big and
unproductive costs that other companies in other countries do not pay,
we cannot be surprised if our jobs and raises begin to disappear and
our pensions come up short as the population ages. 131
Judge and professor Ralph K. Winter argues that the American legal system
unnecessarily raises the costs of capital and thus brakes national economic
growth. He also observes that investors reap little, if any, benefit from class
132. Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1972).
133. Macey & Miller, supra note 124, at 22 (emphasis added). Again, in Ralph Whitworth's
words: "[T]he managers of these lawsuit factories that specialize in these suits, their incentive is
to maximize their share of the settlement at the earliest time possible and move on to the next case."
Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 306 (testimony of Ralph Whitworth).
134. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 323 (testimony of Maryellen Andersen).
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actions because of their huge transaction costs. For instance, he notes that
"some investors will suffer a loss from the indemnification of the defendants and
the funding of the costs of litigation for all parties. Investors who are
diversified against such transfers will suffer a net loss from the costs of the
litigation. Investors who receive damages will benefit, but the amounts will not
be great."' 35 Judge Winter concludes:
Derivative and class actions extract a deadweight loss from investors.
In most such actions, the corporation receives no benefit but pays
everyone's legal fees. In some cases, a benefit is received but is
either paid from insurance that was purchased by the corporation or
offset by indemnification. Because settlement is guided only in small
part by the merits of the underlying claim, derivative and class actions
result in the overcompensation of weak claims and the under-
compensation of strong claims. Investors thus also lose because
fiduciary or statutory obligations-which I assume to be efficient-are
not effectively enforced. '36
C. The Class Action System Encourages Less, Not More, Disclosure
The broad impacts of frivolous class action suits reach beyond the
immediate distortion of recovery by those with real losses. Everyone agrees that
our capital markets operate most fairly and efficiently if investors have as much
information as possible about the companies in which they invest. That is why
the SEC has historically encouraged companies to make voluntary disclosures
of information beyond the required minimum.
But the current securities litigation system, perversely, discourages
managements from disclosing the very type of information that is essential for
intelligent investor decisions. As a matter of fact, these lawsuits create
incentives to withhold information-precisely the opposite effect of what the
securities laws were meant to accomplish.
In a 1993 study of 550 companies' patterns of information disclosure, two
University of California professors show that ,fewer than fifty percent of
companies with earnings significantly above or below analysts' expectations
released early information voluntarily.'37  Moreover, companies are
significantly more reluctant to disclose good news than bad news-good news,
135. Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers:
Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 951 (1993).
136. Id. at 952 (emphasis added).
137. Ron Kasznik & Baruch Lev, The Characteristics and Consequences of Corporate
Discretionary Disclosures (May 1993), reprinted in Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 675.
1994] 907
Mednick and Peck: Proportionality: A Much-Needed Solution to the Accountants' Legal
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994
908 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
of course, would create valuation of their securities at a level that could come
back to haunt them if future results were not as positive. The study concludes
that fear of litigation causes a widespread pattern of minimal disclosure."'n
A recent survey confirms these findings. The National Venture Capital
Association, in a survey of 212 companies, found that seventy-one percent were
more reluctant to discuss company performance with market analysts. 39 The
CEO of one company that was the subject of eight class action lawsuits in 1992
after it reported that its third-quarter earnings would be lower than projected (the
suits were ultimately dismissed after the company spent more than $100,000 in
litigation costs), now reports that it is "'afraid to talk about the upside.""140
In the company's upcoming annual report, "'there isn't a single line that says
what we're aiming for. We're not making any projections because by their very
nature we could be wrong."", 4 1
The testimony of several high-tech company CEOs during the Securities
Subcommittee hearings in the summer of 1993 confirms this chilling effect.
Richard Egan, CEO of EMC Corporation of Massachusetts, explained that the
company now takes a "defensive posture" in its public statements and is
reluctant to make public forecasts because of litigation concern. 42  John
Adler, CEO of Adaptec, a California high-tech firm, testified that many
companies in Silicon Valley "have adopted a 'no communications' policy. That
means they say nothing beyond what they must disclose by law."'"3 Scott
McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems, talked about his company's policy of
offering only "limited guidance" to Wall Street analysts. The company no
longer releases earnings and revenue projections and refuses to comment directly
on analysts' projections. The company decided that the legal risks of providing
such information were too high.'"
In a similar vein, the Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is meeting strong
resistance to its proposal for expanded corporate disclosures of risks and
uncertainties. AICPA's former chairman Jake Netterville testified at the recent
Senate hearings that many commentators opposed the committee proposal on the
138. Id. See also Michael A. Hirsch, C'mon Corporate America, Don't Be So Shy, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (California), Nov. 21, 1993, at 3 ("Louis Thompson, Jr., president and chief
operating officer of the National Investor Relations Institute, believes companies are shutting the
information flow because they fear lawsuits from disappointed shareholders.").
139. Bowers & Gupta, supra note 103, at B1.
140. Id. (quoting Peter Behrendt, chief executive officer of Exabyte Corp.).
141. Id.
142. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 17 (testimony of Richard J. Egan).
143. Id. at 104 (statement of John G. Adler).
144. Id. at 594 (statement of Scott G. McNealy).
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grounds that it will increase liability exposure.'45  The evidence that this
chilling effect is real and widespread is uncontradicted.
D. Shareholder Class Action Litigation Disproportionately Affects High-Tech
and Growth Companies
The present system seriously harms the American economy. It diverts
resources that would otherwise fuel technical innovation and job creation, both
badly needed to grow the economy and to improve the competitiveness of U.S.
firms. Indeed, the principal impact of meritless Rule lOb-5 class action
litigation falls heavily on the new and emerging companies that generate the
largest number of new jobs.' Furthermore, some extend that criticism, such
as William McLucas of the SEC, who believes that "to the extent that these
baseless claims are settled to avoid .. litigation, the system imposes a tax on
capital formation." 47
The system, in short, obstructs capital formation and job creation. Yet
federal regulation of our capital markets is intended, as a matter of public
policy, to make it easier for companies to raise capital, create jobs, attract
investors, and contribute to economic growth. Policymakers must be concerned
that today's system does just the opposite.
CEOs of high-technology companies who testified at the Securities
Subcommittee hearings-representing more than 150 companies employing
585,000 people-stressed this broadly damaging economic effect. Richard Egan,
145. Id. at 300-01 (testimony of Jake Netterville).
146. Indeed, the recent NERA study found that almost one out of every three settlements within
its two-year sample involved high-tech companies. NERA STUDY, supra note 78, at 5; VINCENT
E. O'BRIEN & RICHARD W. HODGES, A STUDY OF CLASS ACTION SECURITIES FRAUD CASES, at
I-8 (1991). The NERA study concluded: "[A] disproportionately large number of securities class
action settlements continue to be suits against high-technology firms," which
suggest[s] that plaintiffs sometimes recover damages when innocent stock price
volatility, rather than fraud, causes the stock price to fall .... [W]e remain troubled by
the continued unusually large number of settlements from high-technology firms ....
The prevalence of suits against high-technology firms suggests that a stock price drop
in response to a timely disclosure is as likely to cause a complaint to be filed as is a
stock price drop from the disclosure of a cover-up. At least for some cases, the merits
would then be of secondary importance.
NERA STUDY, supra note 78, at i, 1, 17.
Similarly, the National Venture Capital Association survey, see supra text accompanying notes
142-44, found that in its survey of 212 companies, "more than one in six young, publicly traded
companies said that they had been defendants in such suits, some more than once. The suits-most
of which are still pending-have already eaten up an average of 1,055 hours of management time
each and $692,000 in legal fees." Bowers & Gupta, supra note 103, at B1.
147. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 37 (statement of William R. McLucas).
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EMC's chief executive, observed that
companies will not take sound risks but will manage their operations
so as to maintain steady performance and avoid stock fluctuation..
• . Management time will be diverted to defend these lawsuits and
U.S. corporations will remain at a disadvantage because you must
constantly think short term in order to deliver acceptable financial
results every 90 days, rather than focusing on long-term development,
a disadvantage with which most of our foreign competitors do not have
to contend. 4
Similarly, Edward McCracken of Silicon Graphics called the current system "an
uncontrolled tax on innovation" that is "impacting real creation of jobs," 4 9
and John Adler, Adaptec CEO, testified that these lawsuits stifle "innovation.
. . creation of jobs, corporate govern[ance] and world-wide competitive-
ness. "150
Frivolous Rule lOb-5 class action litigation puts American companies on an
uphill slope against companies in Japan and Europe that do not face this
perpetual burden of litigation. In 1991, tort costs in Japan and Great Britain ran
well below one percent of national output, while U.S. costs consumed more than
twice as much of the nation's gross domestic product.'5 ' The chairman of a
medium-sized high tech firm observes, "In Japan, executives spend their time
doing business. They don't have to deal with such nonproductive efforts as
litigation. We are going to get our clocks cleaned this way."1s2
Abusive suits cut into the meat of American businesses' ability to pursue
the research and development needed for new ideas and products. John Adler
of Adaptec says the litigation costs of the "multimillion dollar fishing
expedition" conducted against his company in a class-action suit "would have
paid for 20 additional engineers. "'15 Ed McCracken, Silicon Graphics' CEO,
recently gave National Public Radio his view of the bottom-line damage of
frivolous litigation to American business:
[Our firms] are betting on new technologies and new products.
They're trying to produce change and, as a result, create jobs and
148. Id. at 18 (testimony of Richard J. Egan).
149. Id. at 12 (testimony of Edward R. McCracken).
150. Id. at 29 (testimony of John G. Adler).
151. Tillinghast, supra note 89, at 14.
152. Rutter, supra note 132, at 34, 88.
153. John G. Adler, A Frivolous Securities Suit Claims Another Victim: Me, WALL ST. J., Sept.
15, 1993, at A23.
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growth in today's economy -and that, in itself, requires taking some
risks. When you take risks, sometimes they don't work out. And so
these lawsuits, in some ways, encourage firms to take fewer risks.
And also, of course, the money that we spend on defending these
lawsuits is money that comes right out of our research and
development programs.'-A
In sum, as Peter Behrendt, chief executive officer of Exabyte Corp., put it:
"'These suits are a major threat to entrepreneurial companies."55
E. Class Action Litigation Makes It Increasingly Difficult to Attract
Qualified Independent Directors
The liability exposure fostered by the current shareholder class action
system creates another concern: fewer and fewer qualified individuals are
willing to serve on corporate boards of directors because they are nearly always
sued when their companies are sued. For obvious reasons, these individuals do
not want to put their life savings and reputations at risk in order to defend
against allegations of fraud, no matter how meritless. Ironically, the availability
of experienced outside directors is declining at precisely the time when demand
for them is growing.
Clear evidence traces this trend. For example, Jean Head Sisco,
Chairperson of the National Association of Corporate Directors and currently an
outside director on eight boards, stated recently that
the proliferation of these abusive 10b-5 securities suits has caused a
crisis in corporate governance because of the difficulty in attracting
qualified, independent directors. More and more companies are
finding it virtually impossible to fill their board of directors positions
with qualified individuals because these unwarranted securities class
action suits expose outside directors to personal liability .... '56
Furthermore, sixty percent of the members of the American Business
Conference stated in response to a survey that the possibility of being sued has
forced them to weigh more carefully the decision to join a board; twenty-four
percent refuse to serve on boards of start-up firms and other companies that are
154. All Things Considered, Report by Elaine Korry (National Public Radio, Aug. 6, 1993).
In sum, "securities fraud lawsuits are so complex that even the most frivolous ones eat up lots
of time, generate truckloads of paperwork and cost companies a bundle." Rob Perez, More
Companies Fighting Securities Fraud Lawsuits, BUSINESS, Dec. 26, 1993, at D3.
155. Bowers & Gupta, supra note 103, at BI.
156. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 644 (statement of Jean Head Sisco).
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especially vulnerable to securities fraud suits.'57
The inability to attract experienced independent directors especially damages
small, high-tech and growth companies, which often must rely on an
experienced board as a relatively inexpensive means of obtaining expertise as
well as independent oversight on behalf of shareholders. For all companies,
however, the help and guidance that come from experienced outside directors
have become further casualties of the class action system.
VI. PROPORTIONALITY: A MUCH-NEEDED REFORM
To alleviate the increasingly damaging effects of class action suits in tort
litigation spurred by joint and several liability, the existing concept of
comparative fault should be joined by the parallel concept of proportionate
liability. As a practical matter, something must be done to break the magnetic
attraction of plaintiffs' lawyers to deep pocket defendants, regardless of the
merits of a case.
In our view, the most effective way to protect investors would be to reform
the current litigation system-which now generates only cynicism while failing
to motivate compliance-and, at the same time, to activate a swift and sure
disciplinary process for accountants who do substandard work, as the AICPA
has already proposed in a June 1993 report by its board of directors."s One
of the report's other major recommendations was adoption of a proportionate
liability standard in federal securities suits as well as in other claims against
accountants. As we have seen, proportionality is not a novel idea or a radical
departure from American legal norms. Thirty-seven states have reformed their
tort laws by enacting some form of proportionate liability in order to deter
meritless litigation against deep pocket defendants. There is also legislation
pending in both the House of Representatives and the Senate that would, in
different ways, apply proportionate liability to securities litigation brought
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'9
Reforming the doctrine of joint and several liability would help to relieve
some of the nonmerits-based pressure to settle these abusive suits-thereby
157. American Business Conference 1993 survey of members, reported in Securites Hearings,
supra note 70, at 104 (statement of John Adler). The American Business Conference is a group of
100 CEOs of mid-sized American companies with revenues of more than $25 million.
158. AICPA BOARD OF DIRECTORS, MEETING THE FINANCIAL REPORTING NEEDS OF THE
FUTURE: A PUBLIC COMMITMENT FROM THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 6 (June 1993).
159. In the House of Representatives, H.R. 417, introduced by Congressman W.J. (Billy)
Tauzin (D-La.) on Jan. 5, 1993, currently has more than 80 co-sponsors. Senators Christopher J.
Dodd (D-Conn.) and Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) introduced S.1976 on Mar. 24, 1994. See 140
CONG. REC. S6695-3707 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994).
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eliminating the incentive to bring them in the first place. Accountants and other
marginal defendants would no longer be deterred from proving their innocence
at trial out of fear of widely disproportionate liability. Plaintiff s lawyers would
be discouraged from naming deep pocket defendants with only a tangential
relationship to the underlying transaction. This would reverse the perverse
incentives of class action suits in particular. "Because the amount of recovery
from each defendant will be limited by the degree of the defendant's
involvement, the merits of the claim will matter more to the plaintiffs' lawyers
than the depth of the defendant's pocket."6
An independent academic who has recently studied class action cases
believes that a proportionate liability rule would likely reduce the incidence of
meritless litigation against auditors in particular. 6' In Professor Palmrose's
words, the proposed reform of joint and several liability "should reduce
plaintiffs' estimates of the expected value from including marginal defendants
in much litigation under the 1934 Act. This should have the desired effect of
reducing auditors' involvement in weak litigation."162
More importantly, by reducing the incentive to bring numerous meritless
suits, a proportionate liability standard would introduce incentives for plaintiffs'
attorneys to pursue redress for people who have truly been defrauded. In
general, reform should beneficially affect recovery rates in meritorious cases,
while helping to clear court calendars by reducing the number of weak claims.
Plaintiffs' lawyers are now compensated for volume. By removing the
opportunity for easy money offered by meritless litigation, the system could
instead create powerful incentives for these lawyers to pursue genuine fraud.
In sum, proportionate liability would build into the system precisely the
incentives we should want: to obtain more money for investors with good cases
and to stop the filing of cases with no merit.
Installing a rule of proportionate liability is likely to have ancillary
consequences that will strengthen our capital markets and economy. For
instance, reducing the anxiety about frivolous litigation that is so costly to
defend will encourage broader disclosure of useful corporate information, as
well as expanded audits that encompass more relevant though subjective data
such as prospective information. These can only make for wiser investor
decisions and a more-informed allocation of the limited capital resources
available in our country.
Proportionate liability will also protect the many thousands of current
160. Netterville Letter, supra note 68, at 7.
161. Palmrose, supra note 100, at 27-28.
162. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
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investors who lose money when the companies in which they have invested are
plundered by meritless suits and defense costs. Now, companies victimized by
such suits pay huge sums in attorney fees and settlements to dispose of the suits
and get back to business. Those costs amount to money filched from the
pockets of shareholders, diverted from productive uses, such as research and
development, that would raise the value of their investments while creating new
jobs for other Americans."
Defenders of the status quo argue that proportionate liability harms
investors' ability to recover damages caused by fraud-a basic goal of the
securities laws. Far from it. Providing for proportionate liability does not let
wrongdoers off the hook. Joint and several liability should continue to apply
whenever a defendant, including an auditor, is found to have participated
knowingly in fraudulent activity." Further, as previously noted, the new
incentives arising out of the reforms discussed here should encourage a more
intense pursuit of claims where investors have been truly defrauded, raising
recovery rates in those cases. A system based on proportionality simply asks
that a plaintiffs' lawyer prove the amount of harm that a defendant caused his
client. This approach better fits the principles underlying our adversarial
163. Critics of reform argue that, if meritless securities litigation is a problem, existing
provisions of federal law can solve it. They point primarily to Rule 11 and Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, neither is an adequate tool.
Courts are reluctant to impose sanctions under Rule 11, even where complaints appear
completely empty of merit. One of the witnesses at the recent Senate hearings offered a classic
example of the problem: even though the complaint against the corporation of which he is CEO was,
in the court's words, "a fishing expedition at the defendant's expense," Rule 11 sanctions were
denied. Securities Hearings, supra note 70, at 17 (statement of Richard J. Egan). Furthermore,
seeking sanctions under Rule 11 is costly. The defendant has needlessly increased his already high
costs if sanctions are denied. Even if they are awarded, a defendant is not entitled to recover the
cost of defending the ruling on appeal. Proceeding under Rule 11 is for most companies, therefore,
only an invitation to pay higher defense costs. Most firms choose to cut their losses.
Furthermore, Rule 11 has been weakened substantially by a revision that became effective on
December 1, 1993. Under the revised Rule 11, injured parties would have fewer incentives to
challenge opponents' actions because awards of sanctions would be permissive, not mandatory.
Monetary penalties would be paid to the court, not the injured party. Narrowing the range of
awardable costs, Rule 11 would also no longer apply to the costly discovery process.
Under Rule 9(b), fraud claims must be pleaded with particularity. But the rule has a large
loophole when applied to lOb-5 claims: only two federal courts of appeals require the pleading of
particular facts showing that the defendant acted with fraudulent intent. In other courts, a plaintiff
may simply assert that the defendant made a representation "with fraudulent intent"-without setting
forth any facts to establish intent. This loophole allows plaintiffs to proceed with a case without
alleging any facts showing that a misstatement or omission was a knowing lie, as opposed to an
inability or entirely innocent failure to predict the future accurately. This mortally wounds a
defendant's ability to cut off a meritless lawsuit.
164. This is consistent with the conclusion of several states, which, while adopting
proportionate liability as the general rule, have created an exception for intentional torts. See supra
notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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system, since, as a matter of equity, a judgment should be entered against a
defendant only to the extent that evidence demonstrates culpability. Requiring
proof of a link between a defendant's actions and an alleged harm is hardly a
radical departure from the American tradition-rather, it reaffirms our legal
system's fundamental values.
Opponents of proportionate liability also argue that accountants bear a great
deal of responsibility for the harms caused by fraudulent securities activities.
If that is true, however, plaintiffs' lawyers have nothing to fear from
proportionate liability: they will simply be required to present the evidence to
a jury and to demonstrate the level of damages for which an auditor is
responsible. These class action lawyers cannot have it both ways. If
accountants are culpable for the losses they allege, they should have no trouble
proving that level of responsibility before a jury.
Advocates of the status quo argue, finally, that even if there is some
unfairness to some defendants, such as accountants, in a system of joint and
several liability, it is even more unfair to leave a so-called "innocent" investor
with no recovery, which is what critics claim proportionality would do. While
rhetorically appealing, this argument is ultimately unpersuasive.
First, the oft-invoked "innocent investor" is a misnomer. Indeed, if
apportioning liability between plaintiffs and defendants makes sense, and the
joint and several liability rule is reformed in cases of personal injury and
property damage (as many states have now done), modification is fairer still in
cases of investment losses. Any person who suffers harm as a result of
intentional misconduct should, of course, be compensated for the injury. But
the degree to which one is truly a victim varies by the specific circumstances of
the alleged harm. A person injured by a product that he purchased is truly an
innocent victim because he has a reasonable and legitimate expectation that the
product purchased is safe and free from defects. In contrast, a person who
participates in the stock market by investing in an enterprise does so with the
understanding that certain financial risks exist and with the motivation to make
a profit. While the person who buys a product rightfully assumes that all
products are safe, the investor knows (or should know) that some investments
will be winners and others losers, especially in today's economic environment
of rapid change." Unfortunately, many investors ignore the reality that the
coin of reward has an obverse side of risk and responsibility. Former SEC
165. See Jaffe, supra note 110, at 1077 ("A fundamental difference between business tort
plaintiffs and classic tort plaintiffs [i.e., plaintiffs alleging personal injuries] stems from the
consensual nature of commercial activity. Unlike typical tort plaintiffs, business tort plaintiffs...
knowingly put themselves at risk of economic loss by voluntarily engaging in business transactions
in the first place.").
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Chairman Richard Breeden recognized that "litigation in all too many cases may
be seen as the route for trying to recover what may have been market losses.
In effect, some investors may seek a system of 'Heads I win, tails I sue.""'
Second, investors' "right" to a full recovery is illusory now. As discussed
above, an analysis of twenty cases proffered by a class action plaintiffs' lawyer
during the Senate Securities Subcommittee hearings illustrated that investors
obtain a net recovery of only fourteen percent of their legally recoverable
damages.' 67  As discussed earlier, proportionality would likely increase
recovery for investors who are truly harmed by forcing plaintiffs' lawyers to
seek more damages in cases with merit. In addition, proportionality would help
investors in companies victimized by meritless suits by deterring such cases and
preventing the diversion of corporate time and money from productive work.
Finally, proportionality will not, by definition, substantially alter recovery
in the large segment of cases in which (1) all defendants are solvent, (2) there
is one solvent defendant that is jointly and severally liable for having knowingly
engaged in fraudulent activity, or (3) most defendants, or the defendants who are
most culpable, are solvent.
VII. CONCLUSION
Claims under the federal securities laws are only one category of suits
against accountants, but they vividly demonstrate the need to reform a system
that is predicated on joint and several liability and whose original policy and
economic rationales are no longer being served. The basic intent of the federal
securities laws was to protect investors from genuine loss, while fostering an
orderly capital market based on open procedures. Achieving these goals was
meant to encourage investment and promote national economic development.
As our discussion has suggested, however, the outcomes of today's
litigation system do not serve these goals and, indeed, promote the reverse of
what was intended. Instead of protecting investors from genuine loss, the class
action system offers low returns to genuine victims and imposes high costs on
shareholders and companies that are the engines of growth. Instead of curbing
legal abuses, the present system rewards high-volume litigation of meritless
cases and compensates injured investors in minuscule percentages. Instead of
fostering an orderly market based on open procedures, today's system
encourages nondisclosure and threatens high-risk enterprises with withdrawal of
the services they need most. It is no wonder that a recent study of settlements
166. Breeden Remarks, supra note 98, at 9.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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in shareholder class action cases concluded: "Without overstating our statistical
findings, if one had to choose among the most important of three factors in
explaining settlements-stock price volatility, availability of assets and merits of
the case-it would appear that the merits matter the least." "
Thirty-seven states, recognizing the abuses of joint and several liability that
have caused these unhealthy developments, have installed some form of liability
based on proportionality. But these welcome reforms are inadequate to curb
existing abuses and to meet in a timely fashion the goal of promoting national
economic development.
Embodying proportionality in the federal securities laws will move strongly
toward restoring the original public policy intentions of those laws. The further
step of preempting state law to ensure that the same ground rules apply in all
cases alleging accountants' malpractice-as recently recommended by the Public
Oversight Board-would be even more decisive and beneficial.
As this Article has illustrated, proportionate liability is neither a novel
concept nor a radical departure from American legal norms. It would install a
proper mix of incentives to ensure desirable public policy outcomes, while
removing the perverse incentives that now exist. A system based on
proportionate liability would protect and compensate the truly injured better than
the present system does. By deterring meritless litigation and redirecting
incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to seek sound cases instead of high volumes,
it would put more help where it is needed-with those who suffer genuine
losses. The same dynamic would encourage those who are blameless to defend
themselves instead of settling. A not-unwelcome further dividend of reform is
likely to be a reduction in the flow of frivolous cases through overcrowded
courts.
More broadly, proportionality would help to recover an historic purpose of
any democratic legal system: to provide an orderly, just, relatively predictable
framework that offers equitable dispute resolution, creating the cornerstone of
a more productive economy. The consequences of an absent or distorted legal
framework are all too evident in the halting economic development of many
countries today.
A rule of proportionality, as this chapter suggests, would also do much to
reopen the free flow of business information and disclosure, benefiting both
investors and lenders. In addition, experienced business people who today fear
liability exposure from corporate board service would become available again.
168. NERA STUDY, supra note 78, at 16.
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Finally, by removing the threat of wildly disproportionate liability, a rule of
proportionality would restore the full availability of necessary services that
accountants and others are withdrawing today. Both businesses and investors
would benefit enormously, but the ultimate beneficiary would be the American
public, through a more open, competitive economy in a thriving global
marketplace.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [1994], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss3/3
